IBRARY OF CONGRESS, 



<&L/,. ~3. \ 120 



// "T.3.. 



UNITED STATES OP AMERICA. 



THAT THE COMMON 



THEORIES AND MODES OF REASONING 



RESPECTING 



THE B'ET'B.AYITX 0¥ MANKIND 



EXHIBIT IT AS 



A FSfSTSICAX ATTRIBUTE, 



WITH 



A VIEW OF THE SCRIPTURAL DOCTRINE 



RELATIVE TO 



THE NATURE AND CHARACTER OF MAN 



AS 



A MORAL AGENT. 



£ JVEW-YORK: 

PUBLISHED BY F. & R. LOCKWOOD, NO. 154 BROADWAY. 

€. S. Van Winkle, Printer, 2 Thames-street. 



3T *i 2 -° 
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Southern District of New-York, ss. 

BE !T RFMEM'?SBF,D. that on the second day of April, 
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this office the title of a book, the right whereof they claim as Pro- 
prietors, in the words following, to wit : 

« Proofs that the Common Theories and modes of Reasoning res- 
pectin? the Depravity of Mankind exhibit it as a Physical Attribute, 
with a view of the Scriptural Doctrine relative to the Nature and 
Character of Man as a M oral A?ent." 

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JAMES DTLL, 
Clerk of the Southern District of New-Yorl;, 



INTRODUCTION. 



That the Scriptures represent mankind as never obeying 
the taw of God, while left without the renovating influences 
of the Divine Spirit, and as assuming that character in con- 
sequence of the first transgression of their great progeni- 
tor, none, it is believed, who render themselves familiar 
with the sacred page, can easily fail to perceive. Accord- 
ingly by far the greater portion of the Christian world have 
in all ages united in regarding those doctrines as revealed 
truths ; and in considering the former, particularly, as one 
of the most prominent and important taught in the inspired 
volume. But in their speculations in regard to the reason 
that mankind pursue that course of conduct, they appear to 
have formed conceptions respecting the nature of man,— 
conceptions that in their system of belief have of course 
mingled with the truths imbibed from the Scriptures rela- 
tive to the character of man — which not only are not au- 
thorized by the sacred volume, but are inconsistent with 
what are admitted to be some of its most obvious and mo- 
mentous truths. Such it is imagined has been, and is now 
the fact, with at least a large part of the protestant world, 



iv 

and was likewise with many who flourished antecedently to 
the Reformation. 

The error to which allusion is made lies in the views ge- 
nerally presented in the writings both of the past and pre- 
sent day, and exhibited in the pulpit and in conversation, re- 
specting the nature of mankind as moral agents. 

Those views, to a certain extent, and the methods em- 
ployed to vindicate and enforce them, indicate and are 
adapted to produce an impression that the sins of men arise 
from some disorder, defect, or depravity in their physical 
constitution, derived from their common father, and inflict- 
ed on him and them in consequence of his eating the for- 
bidden fruit, and so wrought into his and the nature of 
man universally, as to become a portion of it, and be like 
any other essential property conveyed from parents to chil- 
dren by generation. This depravity, according to the 
statements and arguments respecting it with which the theo- 
logical world abounds, if we admit the. conclusions which 
those arguments and statements authorize, is the sole cause 
that men transgress the law of God ; and its nature is such 
as renders them physically incapable of exercising holi- 
ness. 

On its introduction, the human constitution became to- 
tally incompetent to that whole class of moral exercises 
which are excellent, and adequate only to those which are 
evil. Not indeed by utterly annihilating its moral powers, 
or disqualifying it for all voluntary action; but, as it would 
seem, by extinguishing a certain capacity belonging to it in 
its primeval state, and physically requisite to that species 
ef operations which are morally excellent, though unne- 



cessary to the exercise of the opposite class ; much in the 
same manner as the capacity for that class of sensations of 
which the eye is the medium, is withheld from those per- 
sons who are formed without that organ ; while they are 
left capable of the other kinds of sensation of which other 
organs are the instruments. 

It is not by any means designed to insinuate that those 
into whose minds these conceptions have found their way, 
re'ect all the great doctrines of which &uch a belief is legiti- 
mately subversive ; nor that they regard themselves as lay- 
ing any foundation for all the fatal conclusions which it au^ 
thorizes. The contrary, it is acknowledged, and with the 
highest pleasure, is most notoriously the fact. Though 
they are obviously much perplexed to make out the consis- 
tency of many of their positions ; and after the utmost ef- 
forts of reason, seem still to carry with them some lurking 
feeling that they are entangled in at least apparent contra- 
diction ; yet as a body they formally hold that mankind are 
blameable for their violations of the law of God ; a consi- 
derable portion also represent them as capable of yielding 
obedience to the divine requirements ; and they moreover, 
in large numbers at least, explicitly disown the doctrine of 
a physical depravity when imputed to them. 

Still it is believed many of the opinions which they che- 
rish and regard as of primary importance, involve that 
doctrine ; and much of their language and reasoning is 
precisely such as they would naturally employ if they ex 
animo held it, plainly teaches it, and is fraught with much 
of the injurious influence which would result, were they 
without the intermixture of inconsistent opinions, formally 



vi 

to announce the belief of a physical depravity as an arti- 
cle of their creed. 

The reader is, therefore, desired to understand that it is 
not attempted here to make out that the authors to whom 
reference is made, never disown the doctrine of a physical 
depravity, nor exhibit opinions inconsistent with it ; but 
merely that whatever other opinions may be avowed by 
them, many of the points of belief to which they have given 
a conspicuous place in their creed, in fact involve, aiid much 
of their language and argumentation directly inculcates 
that doctrine, and cannot be used but with the greatest im- 
propriety unless that doctrine is regarded as true. 

The first object then of the present discussion is, to show 
by quotations from theological works of extensive circula- 
tion and high repute, that, if many of the common state- 
ments and arguments relative to the subject are employed 
with any propriety, those views respecting the depravity of 
mankind are, at least virtually, extensively taught. Some 
considerations will then be adverted to, exhibiting their er- 
roneousness ; and a view presented of the constitution of 
man in relation to this subject, and of some conclusions for 
which it prepares the way respecting several other topics. 

The quotations are regarded as presenting a fair speci- 
men of views extensively entertained at the present day 
respecting the subjects to which they relate ; and it is be- 
lieved that at least most of the sentiments they express will 
be too readily recognized to leave it necessary to exhibit 
any farther evidence that they are held. 



PART FIRST. 



Proofs that suck views are exhibited respecting the Depravity 
of Mankind, 

The following quotations present a specimen of the pas- 
sages in which the existence of such a depravity is taught : 

■ <c Original sin is an hereditary depravity and corruption of 
our nature, diffused through every part of the soul, which first 
makes us obnoxious to the wrath of God, and then produces 
in us those works which the scriptures denominate the works 
of the flesh." 

« It was the apostle's design [in Rom. 3.] to teach, that 
all are overwhelmed bj an irresistible calamity, from which 
they cannot escape, unless rescued by divine mercy: and as 
that could not be proved unless manifested by the overthrow 
and ruin of nature, he presented those testimonies [quota- 
tions from the Old Testament] by which he more than de- 
monstrated that our nature is ruined. It follows, therefore, 
that men are such as they are there represented, non pravaz 
duntaxat consuetudinis vitio sed naturoz quoque pravitate ; not 
only by the faultiness of a criminal course of conduct, but 
also by a depravity of nature ; for the apostle's argument, 
that there is no salvation for man but in the grace of God, 
because in himself he is hopelessly ruined, cannot stand on 
any other principle." — InsLCaL Lib. ILCap. /. 8. and///. 2* 



8 

" Original sin standeth not in the following of Adam, (as 

the Pelagians do vainly talk,) but is the fault and corruption 
of ihe nature of every man that naturally is engendered of 
the offspring of Adam, whereby man is very far gone from 
original righteousness, and is of his own nature inclined to 
evil, so that the fiesh lusteth always contrary to the spirit ; 
and therefore in every person born into this world, it de- 
serve! h God's wrath and damnation. And this infection 
of nature doth remain, yea in them that are regenerated." — 
The Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England. 

" We beleeve further, that in the beginning God created 
all the angels and men holy and good, and especially man in 
his likenesse, and to blessed immortality. But they, to wit, 
the angels and the two first of mankinde, did shortly after 
their creation, fall from God their creator-, and have by 
such their fall, brought not only upon themselves the wrath 
of God, but also such a pollution of their natures, that now 
they can no more either will or accomplish any thing that is 
good : which pollution fell on the lost angels at one time ; 
But mankinde inherits such defilement, together with the 
guiltiness both of the first and second death, by propagation, 
one from another : From whence it is that the same corrup- 
tion of mankinde is called original sinne." — Rollers Trans- 
lation of the Declaration of the Faith and Ceremonies of the 
Psaltzgrave Churches, Chap. II. 

The views of Arminius and his followers on the subject 
of original sin were expressed in the following language : 

u True faith cannot proceed from the exercise of our 
natural faculties and powers, nor from the force and opera- 
tion of free will ; since man in consequence of his natural 
corruption is incapable either of thinking or doing any 
good thing." — Moshc'mJs Eccl. Hist. 

"We believe that through the disobedience of Adam, 
original sin is extended to ail mankind, which is a corrup- 



9 



lion of his whole nature, and an hereditary disease, where- 
with infants themselves are infected even in their mothers' 
womb, and which produceth in man all sorts of sin ; being 
in him as a root thereof." — Confession of the Reformed 
Dutch Church, 

" The sinfulness of that estate whereinto men fell con- 
sists in the guilt of Adam's first sin, the want of that righte- 
ousness wherein he was created, and the corruption of his 
nature, whereby he is utterly indisposed, disabled, and made 
opposite to all that is spiritually good, and wholly inclined 
to evil." — Westminster Confession. 

" Man's sinfulness as fallen, consists in the corruption of 
his nature, or a propensity and inclination to all evil, which 
is commonly called original sin; that is original sin inhe- 
rent as distinguished from it as imputed to us. That the 
nature of man is vitiated, corrupted, and prone to all that is 
bad, is taken for granted by all ; and indeed he that denies it, 
must be very much unacquainted with himself, or hardly re- 
tain the common notices which we have of good and evil." 
— Ridgleyh Body of Divinity. 

" Having proved the imputation of the guilt of Adam's sin 
to his posterity, what follows upon it is, the corruption of 
nature derived unto them from him ; by which is meant the 
general depravity of mankind, of all the individuals of hu- 
man nature, and of all the powers and faculties of the soul, 
and members of the body." — GiWs Body of Practical Di- 
vinity. 

" That the best men in the world do often commit sin, 
and have remaining pollution of heart, makes it abundantly 
evident that men when they are no otherwise than they 
were by nature, without any of those virtuous attainments, 
have a sinful depravity, yea must have great corruption of 

2 



10 

nature Makes it evident that man's nature is 

corrupt as he comes into the world." — Edwards* Works, 
vol. (up. 163, 164. 

Mr. John Wesley referred to the ninth Article of the 
Church of England as expressing his views on the subject of 
original sin ; and in discussing the topic in the Minutes of 
Conference, employed the following language : " In what 
sense is Adam's sin imputed to all mankind ? In Adam all 
die; i.e. 1st. Our bodies then became mortal: — 2d. Our 
souls died ; i. e. were disunited from God. And hence ; 3d. 
We are all born with a sinful devilish nature ; by reason 
whereof, — 4th. We are children of wrath, liable to death 
eternal." 

" I am willing to regard the sufferings of the irrational 
tribes as a public token of the depravation of their nature, 
and I must by analogy regard the sufferings and death of 
infants as a token of the depravity of a nature created for 
moral action." — Park Street Lectures, p. 14. 

The Christian Observer, which inculcates the same view 
respecting human nature, represents it as being as much a 
doctrine of Arminianism as it is of Calvinism. — Vol. 3. p. 361 . 

W T hat now is the doctrine relative to mankind with which 
these passages are fraught ? And the single question to be 
decided is, what is the great subject to which they refer ? 
Are they employed solely in delineating the manner in 
which mankind act ? Or instead of that, is the physical na- 
ture of man the grand topic of which they treat ? And 
can any one persuade himself they are occupied merely in 
announcing that mankind while unregenerate uniformly 
transgress the law of God? that their authors, had it been 
their sole object to state that fact, would naturally have se- 
lected such terms as most happily adapted to express it, 
and resorted to such propositions and arguments to sustain 



11 



it ? that such terms, declarations, and arguments can have 
come from minds, which not only had no intention of teach- 
ing the doctrine of a physical depravity, nor any belief of 
the truth of that doctrine, nor any lurking impressions or 
principles which were virtually built on it ; but which ex- 
plicitly regarded the created nature of man as entirely free 
from all corruption, and so far as constitutional powers and 
qualities are concerned, perfectly capable of acting in 
accordance with the divine will ? All this must indeed be 
satisfactorily made out before it can be shown that the doc- 
trine in question is not inculcated in these passages. But 
where are the materials for such a demonstration ? 

But to subject the question to a more thorough trial. 
That the depravity delineated in these quotations is purely 
physical ; a property of the substance of the soul, is appa- 
rent. 

I. From the terms used, which expressly designate it, 
not as a quality of actions, or a trait of character formed 
by the exercise of its voluntary powers, but as a property 
of nature ; and of course therefore a physical attribute. 

II. From the fact that it is represented as existing antece- 
dently to the exercise of any actions, and while, therefore, be- 
side mere existence, nothing but the physical properties of 
the soul can be predicated of it. Its antecedence to the 
commencement of moral action is more explicitly express- 
ed in the following passages : 

" Even infants themselves, although they bring their 
damnation with them from the womb, are condemned for 
their own, not for another's faultiness. For though they 
have not at that time produced the f ruits of their unrighte- 
ousness, yet they have the seed inclosed in them ; nay, their 
whole nature is a mere seed of sin, so that it cannot but be 
odious and abominable to God." 



12 



u And being so vitiated and perverted in all the parts of 
our nature, we are already, on account of that corruption 
alone, deservedly held convicted and condemned in the pre- 
sence of God." — Inst. Lib. II. Cap. I. 8. 

The same views are exhibited by President Edwards. 
The object of his treatise on original sin was. to prove, 
from the fact that the moral character of man while unre- 
newed is sinful, that there exists a depravity in his nature 
which is the cause of his exercising those sinful actions, and 
which of course therefore exists antecedently to their being 
exercised. A passage from that work verifying this state- 
ment will be presented to the reader under the next head. 

But if this depravity thus belongs to the soul antecedent- 
ly to its exercising any moral actions, can any reasoning be 
necessary to show that it must be a physical property ? Can 
any one fancy that at that period any thing belongs to the , 
mind except its mere substance ? In what sense can a 
thing, which by the definition, is neither one of its opera- 
tions, nor a property of any of its operations, be imagined 
to pertain to it at all, unless it is a portion, or an attribute of 
its substance ? 

III. From the fact, that it is represented as the cause or 
source of all the sinful actions which mankind exercise. 
The representation of Calvin in the passages quoted from 
him is, that " it first makes us obnoxious to God's wrath, 
and then produces in us those works which the scriptures de- 
nominate the works of the flesh." Nearly the same ex- 
pressions are employed in the Confession of the Reformed 
Dutch Church ; and similar views are exhibited by Presi- 
dent Edwards, whose language is, 

" All mankind are in such a state,.... that they universally 
run themselves. ... into eternalperdition:.... from which I infer 
that the natural state of the mind of man is attended with a 



13 

propensity of nature which is prevalent and effectual to such 
an issue;" and "this tendency. ...does not consist in any 
particular external circumstances.... but is inherent, and is 
seated in that nature which is common to all mankind, which 
they carry with them wherever they go." — His zvorks, vol. 
6. p. 139. 149. 

The position here assumed, that depraved actions are an 
effect of which an antecedently depraved nature is the cause, 
was thus formally laid down by him as the foundation of 
his reasoning in his treatise on original sin, in proof that 
the nature of man is corrupt ; and he accordingly alleged 
no other species zohatever of evidence to demonstrate the 
depravity of nature, than the simple fact that the actions of 
men are sinful. His argument ran simply thus : The diso- 
bedience of men has a cause, and it either lies in their nature. 
or out of it. But it cannot lie in any thing out of their na- 
ture — " in any external circumstances." Were it other- 
wise, it is incredible that amid the infinitely diversified cir- 
cumstances into which men are thrown, they never assume 
such a modification as to give birth to holy actions. It must 
therefore be " inherent and seated in that nature which is 
common to man." And if the nature of man is the cause 
of his sinning, it must of course be depraved and odious. 
By proving therefore that all the actions of the unregenerate 
are depraved, he regarded himself as establishing the doc- 
trine, that the nature of man is depraved. And by adopt- 
ing a plan of reasoning which in that manner presented all 
the evidence that the actions of men are sinful, as proof 
of the depravity of their nature, he gave the doctrine a re- 
ality and prominence beyond what could have been impar- 
ted by a thousand mere declarations, and taught it with a 
plausibleness, energy, and efficacy which could scarcely 
have been attained by any other method. 

The following language is employed on the subject by 
Mr. Wilberforce : " How, on any principles of common 



14 



reasoning, can we account for it," [the fact that all men sin,] 
" but by conceiving that man, since he came out of the 
hands of his Creator has contracted a taint, and that the ve- 
nom of this subtle poison has been communicated through- 
out the race of Adam, every where exhibiting incontestible 
marks of its fatal malignity ?" " Such" [that all men are 
sinners,] " on a full and fair investigation, must be confessed 
to be the state of facts ; and how can this be accounted for 
on any other supposition, than that of some original taint — 
some radical principle of corruption ? All other solutions 
are unsatisfactory; whilst the potent cause which has been 
assigned does abundantly, and can alone sufficiently ac- 
count for the effect. Thus then it appears, that the corrup- 
tion of human nature is proved by the same mode of rea- 
soning as has been deemed conclusive in establishing the 
existence, and ascertaining the laws of the principle of gra- 
vitation ; that the doctrine rests on the same solid basis as 
the sublime philosophy of Newton." — Wilberforce^s Prac- 
tical View, chap. II. sec. I. 

The reasoning found in the Park-Street Lectures on this 
topic, p. 12. 17, 18, and which will be quoted under a sub- 
sequent head, proceeds on the same principle. 

Dr. Woods, in his controversy with Dr. Ware, expresses 
himself thus on the subject : 

" The uniformity of the fact that men become sinners 
denotes that it results from the settled constitution of our na- 
ture, and not from any occasional or accidental cause. We 
reason thus respecting things which uniformly take place 
in the physical world ; and why not in the moral world ? If 
our becoming sinners is not owing to a steady law or princi- 
ple of our nature, but to some accidental cause, we should 
in all reason expect to find some exceptions." — -p* 159, 
160. 



15 



Accordingly he represents the depravity of man as " na- 
tural," 44 innate," and "resulting from the original constitu- 
tion," in the same sense as are " original strength of mind, 
and liveliness of imagination," a " disposition to society," 
and " a propensity to sympathy or compassion ;" and as 
" hereditary," in the same sense as is the " resemblance 
between children and parents with respect to any properties 
of body or mind." 

It is on the same principle that the reasonings in innu- 
merable other volumes on the subject rest ; and is in short, 
it is believed, that on which all the arguments are founded 
that have ever been employed to prove that the created na- 
ture of man is depraved. 

But — itxan scarcely now be necessary to ask— is the de- 
pravity here described a physical depravity ? Can it be any 
thing else ? It being a quality of nature, in distinction from 
actions ; that is of the substance of the soul, in distinction 
from its operations, it is of necessity a substantial quality* 
It being the cause of all the depraved actions which men ex- 
ercise, it of course exists antecedently to the exercise of any 
of those actions ; that is, at a period when nothing belong- 
ing to the soul has existence, except its mere substance 
and must therefore be one of its physical attributes. 

IV. It is represented as being conveyed from Adam to his 
posterity, and from one generation of his posterity to ano- 
ther, \>j propagation, in the same manner as other constitu- 
tional properties. 

" We believe that original sinne descends unto us from 
Adam, by birth and inheritance," — Articles agreed upon ai 
Marpurge, in 1529, by Luther, Mclancthon, Zwinglius and 
others. 

" Man was at his first creation far different from what all 
his posterity are, who deriving their origin from him after he 



16 



had become corrupt, have contracted from him an heredi- 
tary blemish." 

" We thus learn that the impurity of parents is so trans- 
mitted to children, that ail without exception are polluted 
by their origin. Nor can the beginning of this pollution be 
found, unless we ascend to the first parent of all as to the 
fountain. It is therefore to be regarded as certain that 
Adam was not the progenitor only of human nature, but the 
root as it were, and that therefore for a good reason the hu- 
man species was vitiated by his corruption." 

u It is not absurd at all, if on his becoming despoiled, [of 
the gifts which he received from God at his creation,] nature 
was reduced to nakedness and poverty, — if on his becoming 
corrupted by sin, the contagion crept into nature $ just as 
from a decayed root rotten branches grow which transmit 
their putrescence to the other smaller shoots that spring 
from them. For children are vitiated in the parent in such 
a manner that they cause the corruption of their descend- 
ants."—//^. Lib. L Cap. XV. 8— II. Cap. I. 6, 7. 

" Such as man was after the fall, such children did he be- 
svet — corruption by the righteous judgment of God being de- 
rived from Adam to his posterity, not by imitation, but by 

the propagation of a vicious nature," — Resolutions of the Sy- 
nod of Dort in Buck's Thtol. Diet. Article, Calvinism. 

" That the corruption of nature is conveyed by generation 
seems certain ; for since nature is conveyed in that way, 
the sin of nature must also come in like manner."- GWs 
Body of Practical Divinity. 

" In Adam, as being in his loins when he thus apostatized 
we all sinned and fell under condemnation : his blood was 
attainted for rebellion, and thence that evil nature originated, 



17 



from which all our personal transgressions proceed." — Scott' s 
Notes on Rom, V, 

" Now here is a wonder to be accounted for — sin tainting 
every individual of Adam's race in every age, country and 
condition, and surviving in every heart all exertions to de- 
stroy it. One would think this might prove, if any thing 
could, that sin belongs to the nature of man, as much as rea- 
son or speech, (though in a sense altogether compatible with 
blame,) and must be derived like other universal attributes 
of our nature from the original parent; propagate d like rea- 
son or speech, (neither of which is exercised at first,) pro- 
pagated like many other propensities, mental as well as bo- 
dily, which certainly are inherited from parents — propagated 
like the noxious nature of other animals." 

" If the phenomenon is not accounted for in this easy and 
natural way, so analagous to that great law by which all ani- 
mals propagate their kinds and their dispositions, it must 
remain to the end of time an unsolvable mystery." 

" Now if all men are born depraved, there is the same 
eviJence that depravity is propagated from father to son 
through all generations, as that speech or reason, or any of 
the natural affections are, (though in a sense entirely com- 
patible with blame,) and so it is to be traced back equally 
with them to the original parent. But if, on the other hand, 
infants receive their whole nature from their parents pure ; 
if when they leave the duct through which all properties 
are conveyed from ancestors, they are infected with no de- 
pravity, it is plain that they never derive a taint of moral 
pollution from Adam. There can be no conveyance after 
they are born, and his sin was in no sense the occasion of the 
universal depravity of the world, otherwise than merely as 
the first example." — Park Street Lectures, p. 12. 17. 18. 

3 



18 



Such is the manner in which they have expressed them- 
selves on this subject. Let us now inquire whether a de- 
pravity thus propagated must be a physical property or 
not ; and that it must, few facts it is believed, within the 
compass of our knowledge, are capable of easier demonstra- 
tion. 

A depravity thus conveyed — it will be admitted — cannot 
lie at all in the actions of the being propagated. The doc- 
trine is, that it is an attribute of nature, not of the operations 
of nature ; and that it exists antecedently to the exercise of 
moral actions, and is the cause that those actions are sinful. 
Besides, who ever heard that actions are a subject of propa- 
gation ? The perceptions, feelings, volitions, of offspring de- 
rived from their parents through that medium ! What fancy 
more ridiculous ever entered the imagination ? 

Nor — it will also be admitted — can it lie at all in the mo- 
rn/ influence under which the being propagated exerts his 
actions ; nor in any thing else external to himself. The 
doctrine is, that it is an attribute of himself, not of any 
thing existing without him. And whoever heard that the 
external circumstances of children, or the moral influence 
under which their voluntary actions take place, are a sub- 
ject of propagation ? Is it indeed a fact that the ignorance 
or knowledge, the obscurity or distinction, the poverty or 
affluence, the temptations or restraints, which mark our ca- 
reer through life, are conveyed to us through that channel? 
As, then, it neither lies at all in any thing external to the be- 
ing propagated, nor in any of its actions, it must of course 
exist entirely within the being itself — must constitute a por- 
tion of its physical nature. 

Nothing manifestly beyond the mere physical nature can 
be a subject of propagation. The term indeed cannot be 
employed with any propriety to mean, at most, any thing 
more than the mere fact, that it is in connection with pa« 
rental instrumen tality that the being propagated comes into 
existence,' and assumes that particular modification, or re- 



19 



ceives that structure which forms what is denominated its 
constitution, and by which it becomes a member of the spe- 
cies to which it belongs. And if the influence it denotes ex- 
tends no farther than to determine the time when its sub- 
ject comes into being, and the species of physical constitu- 
tion with which it is endowed, it is of course expended 
wholly on that constitution, and gives birth to nothing but 
its physical properties. The depravity in question, there- 
fore, if thus propagated, must be one of those properties. 

V. The formal statements made relative to the nature of 
this depravity, exhibit the same views respecting it. 

It is exhibited by Calvin, as consisting in such a dete- 
rioration of the mind, as renders it absolutely incapable both 
of that knowledge of God which is necessary to holiness, 
and of that class of volitions which are morally excellent. 
He regarded the mind as made up of the two faculties of 
understanding and will, and says of them : 

" I am pleased with the opinion commonly held and de- 
rived from Augustine, that by sin the natural gifts in man 
were corrupted, and the supernatural extinguished." 

After showing that by the latter he meant holy affections, 
and by the former the understanding and will, he proceeds: 

" The corruption of the natural gifts consists in the loss 
of the soundness of the understanding, and the right state of 
the will ; for although some residue of understanding and 
judgment survives together with will, yet we cannot call 
that understanding whole and sound, which is both weak 
and immersed in thick darkness ; and the corruption of the 
will is too well known. As indeed reason, by which man 
perceives, judges, and discerns between good and evil, is 
an endowment belonging to his nature, it cannot be wholly 
extinguished, but it is partly debilitated, and partly corrupted, 
so that it appears a shapeless ruin* With this meaning John 



20 



said, the light shineth in darkness, and the darkness compre- 
hendeth it not ; which plainly declares both that in the per- 
verse and degenerate nature of man sparks still glitter 
which show him to be a rational creature, and different from 
brutes, because he is endowed with intellect ; and yet that 
that light is suffocated by great grossness of ignorance, so 
that he cannot effectually extricate himself." 

" Why does not [the mind] comprehend that light [which 
shineth in darkness ?] Because its acumen, quicksightedness, 
as far as the knowledge of God is concerned, is mere dark- 
ness ; for the Spirit in calling men darkness, devests them 
at once of all capability of spiritual understanding ; for which 
reason it is declared that believers are born not of blood, 
nor of the will of the flesh, nor of man, but of God : as 
though it were said, the unregenerate man is not capable of 
such sublime wisdom as to apprehend God and divine 
things, unless illuminated by the Spirit." 

" He, I say, [that is carnal] does not comprehend any of 
the spiritual mysteries of God. Why so ? because through 
sloth he neglects to ? No — even if he endeavours, he cannot 
at all y because it is spiritually discerned. But what does 
that mean ? That these things being entirely hidden to hu- 
man perspicacity, are made known by the revelation of the 
Spirit alone." 

As the capacity of the mind for knowledge depends en- 
tirely on its physical nature — physical, because the under- 
standing has no other — the defect here ascribed to it, is of 
course purely of that kind. 

His belief in regard to the will was, that though it is not 
utterly annihilated, yet it has lost that power which Adam at 
first possessed, of exercising either good or bad volitions, 
and become incapable of any except those which are sinful. 
His language is, 



21 



" The will has not indeed perished, because it is insepara- 
ble from the nature of man, but it is so chained by depraved 
lusts, that it is not able to aspire to any thing good." 

« The will is held bound in such a subjection to sin, that 
it is not able to turn — much less, apply itself to that which 
is good." 

And quoting from Augustine, " Man as he is corrupted by 
the fall sins indeed voluntarily, not unwillingly nor by com- 
pulsion — under the influence of strong passion, not by vio- 
lent constraint — by the impulse of his own lust, not of ex- 
ternal force ; — still, such is the depravity of nature, that 
it is not possible for him to be excited to any thing but evil." 
—Inst. Lib. 11. Cap. II. 12. 19,20. Cap. III. 5. 

His object in these passages was— not to teach the fact 
that the will does not choose any thing good — but that the 
voluntary powers are become so imperfect in consequence of 
the fall, that they are physically incompetent to the exercise of 
good volitions ; though still able to exert the opposite class. 
This is manifest from his language, and is demonstrated by 
his employing the fact, that it is so chained to lusts and sub- 
jected to sin as it is ; that is, the fact, that it never chooses 
any thing good, to prove that it cannot make a virtuous 
choice. 

He thus regarded the voluntary powers of the soul, as 
having participated equally with the intellectual, in the 
great and fatal change supposed to have taken place in con- 
sequence of the fall : a change which he imagined left *he^ 
mind capable only of knowing that which is earthly, and 
choosing that which is unholy. 

The same views are exhibited in the following quotation 
from the Catechism and Confession of the Reformed Dutch 
Church: 



22 



;{ Being become wicked, perverse, and corrupt, in all his 
ways, he hath lost all his excellent gifts which he had re- 
ceived from God, and only retained a few remains thereof ; 
which however are sufficient to leave man without excuse." 
" Are we then so corrupt that we are wholly incapable of 
doing any good, and inclined to all wickedness ? Indeed we 
are." 

The theory of President Edwards exhibits this depravity 
as consisting in a want of adaptation in the nature of man 
to holiness. It represents human nature as such originally 
and in all cases, that — without a divine influence — it is ut- 
terly incompetent to any act that is morally excellent, desti- 
tute of the properties requisite for the exercise of such an 
act, and incapable therefore of being made to exert one by 
any combination of circumstances whatever ; and conse- 
quently that there must be a superinduction on it, by the 
agency of the Spirit of God, of a new property, before it 
can be fitted for holiness. These views are expressed in 
the following quotation : 

" The case with man was plainly this : When God made 
man at first, he implanted in him two kinds of princi- 
ples. There was an inferior kind, which may be called na- 
tural, being the principles of mere human nature, such 
as self love, with those natural appetites and passions 
which belong to the nature of man. in which his love to 
his own liberty, honour, and pleasure were exercised. 
These when alone, and left to themselves, are what the 
scriptures sometimes call flesh. Beside these there were 
superior principles that were spiritual, holy, and divine, sum- 
marily comprehended in divine love, wherein consisted the 
spiritual image of God, and man's righteousness and true ho- 
liness, which are called in scripture the divine nature. 
These principles may, in some sense, be called supernatural. 
being (however concreated or connate, yet) such as are 



is 



above those principles that are essentially implied in, or 
necessarily resulting from, and inseparably connected with, 
mere human nature, and being such as immediately depend 
on man's union and communion with God, or divine com- 
munications and influences of God's Spirit ; which though 
withdrawn, and man's nature forsaken of these principles, 
human nature would be human nature still ; man's nature as 
such being entire without these divine principles, which the 
scripture sometimes calls spirit, in contradistinction to flesh. 
These superior principles were given to possess the throne 
and maintain an absolute dominion in the heart. The other 

to be wholly subordinate and Subservient These 

divine principles thus reigning, were the dignity, life, hap- 
piness and glory of man's nature. When man sinned and 
broke God's covenant and fell under his curse, these su- 
perior principles left his heart." .... For indeed God 
left him, — that communion with God on which these princi- 
ples depended entirely, ceased ; the Holy Spirit, that divine 
inhabitant, forsook the house." " Therefore, immediately 
the superior divine principles wholly ceased : so light ceases 
in a room when the candle is withdrawn ; and thus man was 
left in a state of darkness, woful corruption, and ruin — 
nothing but flesh without spirit. The inferior principles of 
self-love and natural appetite, which were given only to 
serve, being alone and left to themselves, of course became 
reigning principles, having no superior principles to regulate 
or control them. The immediate consequence of which 
was z fatal catastrophe, a turning of all things upside down, 
and the succession of a state of the most odious and dread- 
ful confusion It were easy to show how every lust 

and depraved disposition of man's heart would naturally 

arise from this privative original Thus it is easy to 

give an account how total corruption of heart should follow 
on man's eating the forbidden fruit, though that was but one 
act of sin ; without God's putting any evil into his heart, or 



24 



implanting any bad principle, or infusing any corrupt taint, 
and so becoming the author of depravity" — [An easy me- 
thod indeed to escape the charge of teaching that God in- 
troduced such a principle on man's fall, by representing 
that it was implanted there originally, and was only kept in 
check by other constitutional properties which were upheld 
in existence by the presence of the Spirit, and which vanish- 
ed from the constitution on the cessation of the Spirit's influ- 
ence] " Only God's withdrawing as it was highly proper 
and necessary that he should from rebel man being as it were 
driven away by his abominable wickedness, and man's natu- 
ral principles being left to themselves, this is sufficient to ac- 
count for his becoming entirely corrupt and bent on sinning 
against God." — His Works, vol. 6. p. 423, 429, 430, 431. 

Two or three remarks will show the conclusions to which 
this theory carries us respecting the nature of depravity. 

1st. It teaches that the physical constitution of man suffer- 
ed an important change at the fall, by the subtraction of a 
portion of the attributes denominated "superior princi- 
ples," with which it was originally endowed. By these su- 
perior principles the author undoubtedly meant physical at- 
tributes of the mind ; not mere feelings or exercises. What 
propriety can there be in interpreting the superior, more 
than the inferior principles, to denote actions ? Do the 
latter, if used in that sense, mean unholy actions ? But they 
are expressly declared to have been in man in innocence. 
Can he have meant to teach that man exercised unholy 
actions in innocence, or sinned before the fall ? Or do they 
mean holy actions ? Why then are they depicted as essen- 
tially different in their nature from the superior principles ? 
as destined to an office wholly subordinate ? And why are 
they not also represented as ceasing, like the other class, 
on the departure of the Spirit's influence ? Or why is man 
declared — by being left with them alone — to have been 
iL left in a state of darkness, w r oful corruption, and ruin?" 



25 



Besides, what is the propriety of the statement that hu- 
man nature was not annihilated by the loss of those supe- 
rior principles, if he only employed them to denote actions? 
if he neither believed — nor regarded himself as having 
conveyed an impression to his readers — that their loss had 
produced any change whatever in that nature ? Or what, 
unless they were regarded as physical attributes, is the pro- 
priety of their being represented as implanted in man, as 
truly as were those which are inferior; and as constituting 
" the dignity, life, happiness, and glory" of his " nature. 

But that by those superior principles he meant physical 
attributes solely, and not mental operations, is demonstra- 
ted by his employing the loss of those principles to account 
for the fact, that man continued to sin after the fall, instead 
of yielding obedience as at first ; which were supremely 
illogical, had he used the term to denote actions, instead of 
constitutional attributes. It were to make the loss of his 
holy actions— -holy of course as they were exercised antece- 
dently to the fall — the cause of his ceasing to exercise holiness, 
and yielding to the " predominance'' of unholy actions — • 
if the " inferior principles" mean such — as they must by the 
same rule of interpretation. The lossof his holy actions — that 
is, his ceasing to exercise holiness, the cause of his ceasing to 
exercise holiness ! What is this but the grossest nonsense ? 
To verify this representation, the reader is desired to sub- 
stitute actions in place of principles in the quotation, and 
he will perceive the absurdity such an interpretation in- 
volves. But is this the manner in which the mind of Ed- 
wards considered an easy and satisfactory explanation as 
made out, of the rebellion of mankind ? No one can for a 
moment imagine that such was his meaning. And if it was 
not, he must of course have employed the terms to denote 
physical attributes : as beside its operations, nothing but its 
physical properties belongs to the mind. 

2d, The theory exhibits the presence of those principles 

4 



26 



in the constitution of man, as necessary in order to his being 
capable of exercising holiness, and consequently represents 
their extinction, as rendering him physically incapable of 
obedience. This is seen from the description of them. 
They are represented as far more excellent in their nature, 
and destined to a much more exalted office than those of the 
inferior class, as constituting " the spiritual image of God" 
in the soul, and " the glory of man's nature," and as " given 
to possess the throne and maintain absolute dominion in the 
heart whilst the others were greatly inferior in their na- 
ture, and formed for a totally inferior office ; u to be wholly 
subordinate and subservient." But what propriety is there 
in a delineation that throws their nature and destiny so wide 
asunder, if after all the inferior class approaches so near to 
the superior, that no physical obstacle hinders its ascending 
from its appropriate sphere, and performing the service for 
which the superior class was designed ? 

But all doubt that President Edwards regarded them as 
necessary, in order to render the constitution physically 
competent to act in conformity to the divine will, must be 
removed by the circumstance that he represents the loss of 
those superior principles, as the sole cause of the subsequent 
disobedience of mankind ; a representation without pro- 
priety, unless their removal from the constitution was 
considered as having left it absolutely incapable of obe- 
dience. For if the surviving portion of nature were still 
physically adequate to obedience ; if the inferior principles 
after fulfilling their own proper office, were competent to 
discharge the functions also of the higher class, it does not 
follow that the extinction of that higher class must infallibly 
have caused an universal violation of the divine re- 
quirements : nor that it actually did. If nature is still left 
as truly capable of yielding obedience as it was before, no- 
thing surely so far as that only is concerned, is seen but that 
it as certainly will yield it. The certainty of its diso- 
bedience must be constituted by something external to itself; 



27 



namely, those objects which are to exert on it the influence 
under which it is to exercise its various capacities for action; 
or rather the moral influence itself under which it is to exert 
those capacities, and which are to determine the manner in 
which it acts. 

Where then, to place the subject beyond controversy, did 
President Edwards regard the certainty, that man would 
sin, as lying ? in the nature of the constitution with which he 
was left after the fall, or out of it ? namely, in the moral in- 
fluence, which was to be brought to bear on that nature, 
and under which it was to act ? Indubitably in that nature, 
and solely within it. This is demonstrated indeed by his 
assigning the state in which it was left by the fall, as the 
cause of the universal rebellion of men. But beyond this, 
it was the avowed and sole desig?i of his treatise on original 
sin, to establish that position. His language is, " All man- 
kind are in such a state . . . that they universally run them- 
selves .... into eternal perdition, .... from which I 
infer that the natural state of the mind of man is attended 
with a propensity of nature which is prevalent and effectual 
to such an issued And " this tendency .... does not 
consist in any particular external circumstances, .... but 
is inherent, and is seated in that nature which is common to 
mankind, which they carry with them wherever they go." 

Accordingly he devoted the whole work to the proof and 
vindication of that doctrine. 

It was his belief, therefore, that it is the nature of man 
solely that is the cause of his sinning, and that constitutes 
the certainty that he will continue to sin. But as that can- 
not be inferred, unless it is assumed — virtually at least — ■ 
that his nature is physically incapable of obedience, for if it is 
actually capable of it, it« does not itself constitute a cer- 
tainty that it will not obey ; it presents no certainty that it 
will not exert that capacity ; — it is the representation of his 
theory, that such a physical incapacity pertains to the con- 
stitution of man. 



28 



It appears then, according to this theory, that an impor- 
tant portion of the powers with which man was original- 
ly endowed, was stricken from his constitution at the fall ; 
that in consequence of their eradication his nature was left 
physically incapable of acting in conformity to the divine 
will ; and that it is this inability of nature to yield obedi- 
ence ; or in other words its total adaptation and tendency 
to sin, that constitutes that " sinful depravity" and " great 
corruption of nature" with which " man comes into the 
world."-—/?. 163, 164. 

But this depravity is more commonly represented as con- 
sisting in a disposition, taste, relish, or propensity implant- 
ed in the soul, which is the cause of its liking or disliking 
the moral objects presented to its view ; and the nature of 
which is such, that sin is supremely agreeable, and holiness 
supremely disagreeable to it' ; such, that all the moral influ- 
ence of what kind or degree soever brought to bear on the 
mind, is rendered an excitement to sin; that which naturally 
tempts to evil by the gratification it affords; and that which 
is adapted to prompt to holiness by the aversion which it 
excites. A specimen of the manner in which this disposi- 
tion is described is presented in the following quotations : 

" Human nature must be created with some dispositions, 
or disposition to relish some things as good and amiable, and 
to be averse to other things as odious and disagreeble ; other- 
wise it must be without any such thing as inclination or 
will. It must be perfectly indifferent, without preference, 
without choice or aversion towards any thing as agreeable 
or disagreeable. But if it had any concreated dispositions 
at all, they must be either right or wrong, either agreeable 
or disagreeable to the nature of things. If man had at first 
the highest relish of those things that were most excellent 
and beautiful, a disposition to have the quickest and highest 
delight in those things that were most worthy of it, then 



29 



his dispositions were morally right and amiable, and never 
can be decent and excellent in a higher sense. But if he 
had a disposition to love most those things that were infe- 
rior and less worthy, then his dispositions were vicious. 
And it is evident there can be no medium between these." 
— Edwards* Works, vol. 6. p. 267, 268. 

" If you mean by disposition, a taste or principle that is 
the foundation of exercises," — and it is that use of the term 
to which this discussion relates, — " then it is evident that 
an object to be beloved must be adapted to the existing dis- 
position. Of course it had no influence to produce it. If 
you admit the existence of a taste or principle, and call the 
object the motive which moves the heart to action, you will 
readily allow that the object must be accommodated to the 
taste before it can become a motive ; that is, before it can 
be beloved. It must find the disposition prepared to enter- 
tain it before it can move the heart. A hated object can 
never be a motive to love ; and a beloved object finds the 
taste already in its favour. The power of the object to 
become a motive presupposes a disposition in the heart to 
love it. Of course it did not produce that disposition even 
as a second cause. ...The word of God is in no sense in- 
strumental in changing the disposition. It is enough to ask 
how can the motives of religion be the instruments of pro- 
ducing a new disposition, when that disposition must exist 
before the motives can take hold of the heart?" — Park- 
Street Lectures, p. 153, 154. 157. 

But is this disposition a physical property ? What else can 
it be ? It is not a volition. It is not a feeling or exercise. 
It is not any mental operation whatever, nor an effect, nor in 
any manner a consequence of any such operation ; for it 
exists, and must according to the representation, before any 
moral feeling or volition can take place in the mind ; is the 
foundation of all such exercises, and determines their moral 



30 



nature. But that is to give it being at a period when no- 
thing beside its physical properties belongs to the soul. 
Trace the mind up to the moment antecedent to its first 
exercise, and can any thing be seen or conceived then to 
belong to it except its mere substantial nature ? If then 
this disposition is predicable of it at that period, it must be 
exclusively as a physical attribute. 

VI. In accordance with these views, mankind are repre- 
sented as totally unable to exercise holiness, or avoid the 
commission of sin. 

In reply to the charge that the divine requirements can 
be no better than mockery, unless a compliance with them 
lies within our power, Calvin employs the following lan- 
guage : 

" It has indeed long been a common opinion that the fa- 
culties of men are co-extensive with the requirements of the 
divine law, and it has some speciousness, but it proceeds 
from a total want of acquaintance with the law. For those 
who regard it an egregious crime to say that the observance 
of the law is impossible, insist — as though it were an invin- 
cible argument — that were that the case, the law was given in 
vain. They talk just as though Paul had never said any 
thing about the law. For what to them I pray can [these 
passages] mean ? " The law was added because of trans- 
gressions — " by the law is the knowledge of sin ;" — " is 
the law sin?" — "the law entered that the offence might 
abound ?" That [the law] is limited to our strength, lest it 
should be given in vain? Indeed, instead of that, it was 
made far above us, in orderthat it might produce a conviction 
of our impotence." " If there had been only a mere require- 
ment, without any promise, a trial would have been made 
whether our powers are sufficient to meet the demand. But 
since promises are connected with it, which proclaim, not 
only that aid, but that our whole strength lies in the assist- 
ance of divine grace ; they show sufficiently, and more than 



31 



sufficiently, that we are absolutely unadapted, — not to say 
incompetent to the observance of the law." u I deny that 
God cruelly mocks us when he invites us, knowing that we 
are totally impotent to qualify ourselves for his blessing." 
And quoting from Augustine — " God requires what we can- 
not perform, in order that we mav know what we ought to 
seek from him." — InsU Lib. II. Cap. V. 6, 7. 10. 

The resolutions of the divines at Dort on this subject, are 
thus expressed : 

" All men are conceived in sin, and are born the children 
of wrath, unfit for every good connected with salvation, 
prone to evil, dead in sin, and the servants of sin ; and with- 
out the Holy Spirit regenerating them, they neither will nor 
can return to God, amend their depraved nature, nor dispose 
themselves for its amendment." — Buck?s Theol. Dict.VolA* 
p. 110. 

The Westminster divines employed the following lan- 
guage: 

" Man by his fall into a state of sin hath wholly lost all 
ability of will to any spiritual good accompanying salvation; 
so as a -natural man, being altogether averse from that good, 
and dead in sin, is not able by his own strength to convert him- 
self, or to prepare himself thereunto." 

The language of the Catechism of the Reformed Dutch 
Church is, 

" Are we then so corrupt that we are wholly incapable ot 
doing any good, and inclined to all wickedness ? Indeed we 
are, except we are regenerated by the Spirit of God. Doth 
not God then do injustice to man by requiring from him ia 
his law that which he cannot perform ? Not at all. For 



32 



God made man capable of performing it ; but man, by the in- 
stigation of the devil and his own wilful disobedience, de- 
prived himself and all his posterity of those divine gifts." 

" I shall endeavour to make it evident that such is the cor- 
ruption of human nature derived from Adam, and such man's 
disability contracted by it, that without the special grace of 
God, he can do nothing spiritually good, and only that which 
is evil" — GilPs Cause of God and Truth, 2d Vol. p. 260. 

" All capacity of delighting in the holy services and spiritual 
worship of God is extinct in every descendant of Adam, till 
the spirit of life in Christ Jesus restores divine life to the 
soul by regeneration." — Scott^s Notes on Genesis III. 

The following quotation from Smalley's sermon on moral 
inability, expresses an opinion, openly avowed by many, and 
furnishes a specimen of the language which is often heard 
on the subject: 

Some account for God's suspending our salvation upon 
impossible conditions, and condemning men for not doing 
what it is not in their power to do, by observing that we lost 
our power by the fall. Our present weakness and blindness 
was brought upon us as a righteous punishment for the dis- 
obedience of Adam; and God, they say, has not lost his right 
to command, because man by his own folly and sin, has lost 
his ability to obey." 

These declarations are made expressly in relation to the 
physical constitution of man. And can any one fail to see 
that those who penned, and those who have adopted them, 
inculcate the existence of a physical depravity ? They ex- 
plicitly affirm that men are totally destitute of power to yield 
obedience to the divine will. Of course that want of pow- 
er is the sole cause of their disobedience. There is no 



33 



room for the intervention of a moral cause, when nothing 
whatever depends on the will. But what is that, but in the 
most absolute manner to make a defect in their physical 
constitution the cause of their disobedience ? 

To confine the remark to the authors of these quotations. 
No one surely can doubt from these and other passages pre- 
sented from their works, that they regarded this depravity as 
the cause of every sin which mankind commit. They re- 
present all sin as being produced by it. But they here 
expressly declare that the nature of their physical constitu- 
tion is such, that it is impossible for them to pursue the 
course which God has prescribed to them in his law; or to 
make any approximation toward it. What is this but mak- 
ing the nature of that constitution the cause of all their 
sins ? that is, making it that very depravity to which the 
production of their sins was before ascribed. And are not 
these remarks equally applicable to all who employ similar 
language on the subject ? 

VII. As an obvious result from these views, it is held 
that no kind whatever nor degree of moral influence that 
can be brought to bear upon mankind, can lead them, or 
have any tendency to lead them to exercise holiness. 

" If man is dead in the moral sense, that is, has lost all 
principles of true virtue entirely, he is as absolutely beyond 
the reach of all means as to their bringing him to life again, 
as one that is dead in the natural sense. Moral means can 
only work upon such moral principles as they find to work 
upon. They cannot produce a new nature, new principles 
of action, any more than natural means can make new life 
for themselves to work upon in a dead carcase. Cultiva- 
tion and manuring may make a bad tree grow and bear 
fruit after its kind, but can never make a thorn bear figs, or 
a bramble bush grapes. Let what means will be used, so 
long as the tree is evil, the fruit will be so likewise. If 

5 



34 



mankind have lost the moral image of God entirely, it is 
easy to see that nothing short of a nezo creation can restore 
it to them. If they are dead in trespasses and sins, the 
quickening them must be an instance of the working of 
God's mighty power in a supernatural manner, like that 
of raising Christ from the dead. And without a work of 
this kind, whatever means are used with them, they will 
never have the least spiritual life or real holiness." — - 
Smalley^s Sermon on Natural Ability, 

This doctrine is exhibited in still bolder relief, and incul- 
cated with greater plausibility and energy, in the language 
and reasonings commonly employed respecting the " old 
disposition." The statements and arguments in regard 
to it not only represent it as utterly impossible that any 
species or degree of moral influence should excite men to 
the exercise of holiness; but as totally impossible that 
it should not produce precisely the opposite elFect. Some 
passages expressing these views have already been quoted. 
The following may be added. 

" But if the heart of sinners is depraved, if they hate the 
true character of God in whatever form it appears, they 
will hate it the more the more it is seen, and light so far from 
abating will only rouse the enmity to stronger action. ...But 
motives have no influence to produce a new disposition in 
either sense of that word — least of all can they produce that 

heavenly temper which is wrought in Regeneration But if 

the carnal mind is hostile to the true God, it will hate him 
the more the more he is seen ; and light (as at the Last Day) 
will only rouse the enmity to stronger action. To use light 
then as an instrument to cure the disposition, is like using 
oil to extinguish fire." — Park-Street Lectures, p. 118. 156, 
1,57. 



35 



This is undoubtedly good reasoning, if the obstacle to 
be overcome is purely physical ; but not otherwise. It 
proceeds entirely on the ground that this disposition is such, 
that a moral influence, from its nature, is not at all adapted 
to remove it. It is for that reason that it is believed no 
agency of motives which can be brought to bear on the vo- 
luntary powers, no matter to what extent it is carried, nor 
what modification it assumes, can have any tendency to 
subvert it. But what is that but a complete definition of a 
merely physical attribute ? What more can be said of any 
property, over the existence of which the will can exert no 
influence, and has no jurisdiction ? If a moral influence, 
from its very nature, is wholly unadapted to change this 
disposition ; if from its nature a physical agency is neces- 
sary to accomplish a change in it ; must it not be solely be- 
cause it is a merely physical property ? 

But to try the question more closely. It will be admit- 
ted, that the cause that no moral influence can change the 
disposition, is either a want of adaptation in the nature of 
that influence to produce the change ; or else a deficiency 
in its degree. But those who hold the doctrine in question, 
do not allow that it is the latter : They expressly teach, 
that advance it to any degree of strength whatever within 
the compass of possibility, and still it cannot excite men to 
the exercise of holiness, nor make any approximation to- 
ward it; nor even fail of producing directly the opposite 
effect. But if it is the former, then the ground of that 
want of adaptation must be, that the disposition is a phy- 
sical, instead of a moral attribute, and therefore requires 
a physical agency to effect any change in it. 

Or in other words : the cause that no moral influence can 
produce a change of the disposition is, either that the struc- 
ture of the mind is such, that it is destitute of a physical ca- 
pacity for that class of volitions which is morally excellent, 
and therefore a moral influence has no adaptation to produce 
such volitions in it, any more than it has in brutes, or any 



S6 



thing else totally incapable of them ; — and will the friend* 

of the doctrine in question admit that ? it is precisely what 
they are regarded as teaching: — or else the mind has all the 
physical capacity requisite for the exercise of such volitions; 
and the cause that it cannot be made to exercise them, is 
simply, an impossibility of bringing such a degree of moral 
influence to bear on it, as is necessary to lead it to exert 
that capacity. A capacity lodged in the mind of man, 
which it is absolutely impossible should ever be brought 
into exercise ! How then is its existence proved? Who can 
discover the existence of what can never be made to deve- 
lop itself? God has endowed every one of his moral crea- 
tures in this world with a capacity which, with all his in- 
finite resources of contrivance and execution, he can never 
in a single instance bring into exertion! Has God then 
given powers which are beyond his control ? What is this 
capacity ? The self-determining power of the will, which 
the friends of the subject in question have so often employed 
themselves in annihilating ? But no one surely will feel in- 
clined to adopt this side of the alternative. It can never be 
believed that God has communicated powers which he is 
utterly incapable of bringing into exercise. It must then 
be admitted that if such an attribute as the disposition in 
question exists in the human mind, its nature must be purely 
physical. 

VIII. If a moral influence is thus entirely unadapted to lead 
men to the exercise of holiness, it follows, as an obvious con- 
sequence, that the renovation of the heart is caused by a 
purely physical agency, and is itself nothing more than a 
physical effect. Accordingly it is taught as a part of the 
system under consideration, that the regenerating agency of 
the Divine Spirit is solely of that kind, and is employed 
solely in producing a physical change. 

" The divine operation in regeneration of which the new 
heart is the effect, is immediate ; or it is not wrought by any 
means as the cause of it ; but by the immediate power aiid 



37 



energy of the Holy Spirit. It is called a creation ; and the 
divine agency in it is as much without any medium, as in 
creating something from nothing. Men are not regenerated 
in the sense in which we are now considering regeneration 

by light, or by the word of God That operation which 

changes the evil eye to a single eye cannot be by means of 
light, but must take place antecedent to any light, or any 
influence or effect that can be produced by it." — Hopkins* 
System of Divinity, Vol. 1. p. 536. 

" The Calvinist tells you that the heart is so depraved 
that it will not improve divine influence till it is changed ; that 
it stubbornly resists all light and motives till it is forced to 
submit ; that the moral Ruler has as much occasion to sub- 
due it by strength, as an earthly king to quell by force his 
rebellious subjects ; and that the simple history of the 
change is, that God makes his people willing in the day of 
his power... ./The decisive question is, was the power [by 
which regeneration was produced] applied to the motives to 
open a passage for themselves — or to the heart to open a 
passage for them? Let the event declare; the heart was 
new before the motives entered. As then the change in 
question is effected neither by mechanical causes, nor by 
the influence of motives, it is not brought about by any of 
the laws of nature, and of course is supernatural. An 
effect may be supernatural which is produced by a second 
cause, if that cause is above nature, for instance an angel ; 
but the one under consideration is not only supernatural, but 
immediate ; or if not altogether immediate because there 
was such an antecedent as the presentation of motives, yet 
immediate in the sense in which those effects were which 
followed the extension of Moses 5 rod, the blast of trum- 
pets before the walls of Jericho, the voice of Ezekiel in the 
valley of dry bones, the application of clay to the eyes of 
the blind man, &e. In all these cases the antecedent had 
no such influence as belongs to a second cause in nature*, 



S3 



for instance to fire as the agent in consuming a building ; 

but every body sees that the power was as immediately ex- 
erted as though no antecedent had taken place. In the same 
sense the power which changes the heart is immediate, act- 
ing through no second cause ; producing its effect by no m- 

strument Regeneration is the formation of the eye, but 

light is necessary to actual vision." — Park-Street Lectures, 
p. 144, 145. 158, 159. 176. 

The reader perceives these passages deny that the Spirit 
of God employs a moral influence, or any means whatever 
in regenerating the mind, and represent the change as ac- 
complished solely and directly by the divine energy — by an 
immediate act of Almighty power on the soul ; and there- 
fore by an agency in the strictest sense physical. 

But is the change produced merely a physical effect ? 
Unquestionably. V/hy is a physical agency employed, un- - 
less the effect to be produced is solely of the same nature ? 
The regenerating influence must be employed either in ef- 
fecting a change in the physical constitution, or else simply 
in exciting the soul to an exertion of the attributes with 
which it was before endowed. If it is only the latter, why is 
the immediate act of the Divine Spirit, instead of second 
causes, necessary to accomplish it ? Are there no second 
causes in existence, or can none be created, which can be 
brought to act on the mind in such a manner, as to lead it 
to exert all its attributes ? — to exhibit every capacity of its 
nature ? 

But to subject the question to a more thorough or- 
deal. It must be admitted that the agency of the Divine 
Spirit in regeneration is employed either in effecting a 
change in the physical constitution, or else in simply pro- 
ducing an act or operation of the constitution which before 
existed. But the theory under consideration explicitly de- 
nies that it is employed in producing the latter. It repre- 
sents the effect produced as being a " new disposition." 
which is " the foundation" of the " exercises" of the mind. 



39 



and necessarily exists antecedently to the exercise of anf 
holy act. The language of the Park-Street Lectures — and 
it undoubtedly expresses the views generally held on the 
subject — is, " Though the Word of God in the shape of 
motives has an important use in occasioning the exercises 
of the new heart, it is in no sense instrumental in changing 
the disposition." It must be acknowledged that we can see 
no instrumentality in truth to create, or increase, or con- 
tinue the new disposition. In the regulation of that power 

truth has none of the influence of a second cause It may 

then be asked, why should a second cause intervene, which 
has no influence ? if divine power produces the whole ef- 
fect, why couple itself with a powerless cause ? These 
questions would be unanswerable if there was nothing to be 
done but to create and continue, and increase the new dis- 
position ; but there are views and affections and acts of the 
will and motions of the body to La produced, or the disposi- 
tion is utterly useless. In the production of all these, both 
in their beginning and in all the degrees of their increase, 
truth, when it finds the disposition favourable, has the pro* 
per influence of a second cause.".,.." At the time of con- 
version" [which is represented as a consequence of regene- 
ration] " the truths of the word are the instruments of pro- 
ducing all the thoughts which fill the understanding, all the 
motions of the heart, the will and the body ; and are the in- 
struments therefore of producing the whole of that turning 
which the term imports." — p. 156. 172. 175- 

The most specific and palpable distinction is thus made 
between the new disposition, which is represented as the ef- 
fect produced by the regenerating influence ; and all the 
holy exercises of the mind of what kind soever they are. — 
The former exists antecedently to ~ the latter, and is the 
source or "power" from which they spring, and is caused 
by the immediate act of the Divine Spirit, without the co- 
operation of any means : — whilst " the truths of the word 



40 



are the instruments of producing the whole" of the latter, 
whether they are " thoughts of the understanding," or u mo- 
tions of the heart, the will or the body." . . And it is this 
distinction between the new disposition, and all holy exer- 
cises, which the ordinary use of the terms regeneration and 
conversion denotes ; the former being employed to designate 
the effect produced by the regenerating influence ; and the 
latter the first holy exercises which take place in the mind, 
and which are considered as the consequences of regenera- 
tion. As then, according to this representation, the agency 
of the Divine Spirit in regeneration does not produce any 
operation of mind whatever, it remains that it must be em- 
ployed simply in producing a change in the physical consti- 
tution. 

That such is the doctrine of the theory under consider- 
ation, is to be inferred moreover from the views it exhibits 
of the nature of depravity. As depravity is represented as 
consisting in a physical incapacity for holiness — regene- 
ration, by which the mind is fitted for the exercise of holy 
actions, will of course be exhibited as consisting in such a 
change of the physical constitution as makes it capable of 
holiness. 

Such are some of the modes in which, it is believed, the 
doctrine of a physical depravity is taught. It is now time 
to pause, and cast the eye back over the ground which has 
been traversed, and collect the result. It has been seen that 
the depravity of mankind is represented as an attribute of 
nature, in distinction from actions ; as existing in the mind 
antecedently to its exercising any actions ; and as being the 
cause that all its moral exercises are sinful, — as being con- 
yeyed from parents to children by propagation, in the same 
manner as other constitutional properties ; as consisting in 
a want of adaptation in the powers of the soul to that class 
of exercises which are morally excellent ; and consequently, 
as being such, that it renders men utterly incapable of holi- 
ness ; such that no moral influence has any power or ten- 



41 



dency to lead them to it ; and finally such, that it is by pro- 
ducing a change in their physical constitution, that the Spi- 
rit of God tits them for acting in conformity to the divine 
will. What then is the result ? Can any doubt remain that 
those who make these representations, inculcate the exis- 
tence of & physical depravity ? Can it be, after all this, that 
the idea that such a doctrine is taught is a mere illusion ? — 
a gratuitous freak of the imagination ? What can be required 
to make out a demonstration that such a doctrine is incul- 
cated ? Declarations, — which according to the just meaning 
of language must denote such a doctrine ? The passages 
quoted contain an abundance of such. Formal definitions— 
which if any regard is had to the proper force of their terms, 
to the great principles on which they rest, or to the results 
which they authorize, cut off the possibility of their in- 
volving any other meaning ? The reader has been presented 
with a multiplicity of such. Arguments, — whose whole 
force and propriety depend on the existence of such a de- 
pravity ? Such is the character of the great mass of the rea- 
soning which has been employed on the subject by the theo- 
logicalworld, for nearly three hundred years, to say nothing 
of what prevailed antecedently. What farther evidence 
can be necessary ? 

Is it said ? " But those who make these representations, — - 
and it was true also of their predecessors, — hold and incul- 
cate doctrines totally inconsistent with and subversive of 
this." Admitted. Such doctrines are indeed scattered thickly 
over the pages of their works, and form a conspicuous fea- 
ture of their creed ; and thanks be to God for it — they are 
the redeeming principle of their system, and what has drawn 
down the blessing of heaven on their ministry, and made it 
the instrument of so much good to .the world. But the 
question is not at all, whether they do not believe and teach 
other doctrines subversive of this ; but whether they do not 
inculcate this doctrine, whether the passages which have 



42 



been quoted, by the just principles of interpretation do not 
necessarily, not to say exclusively, involve it 5 whether it 
does not constitute the very substance and soul of their 
common declarations, statements, and reasonings respecting 
the subject ? If such is the character of their arguments, 
definitions and language, the thing attempted to be made 
out is demonstrated. Their believing and teaching other 
doctrines inconsistent with this, no more proves that they 
do not inculcate this, than their inculcating this proves 
that they do not teach any thing contradictory to it. The 
sole thing in controversy is, what is the proper meaning of 
their language on the subject ? what are the results to which 
their definitions, and the great principles on which their 
reasoning depends inevitably carry us ? And can any one 
doubt what those results are ? 

But is it said ? " Those who are regarded as inculcatingthe 
doctrine in question, do not view their system as authorizing 
the conclusions which that doctrineinvolves." Grant that it is 
so. Does it thence follow that it does notauthorize those con- 
clusions ? Do men never hold and teach doctrines fraught, — - 
without their perceiving it — with the subversion of many 
other important points of their belief? Do they never reason 
upon principles, which, if followed up legitimately, would 
force them to results from which they would recoil with sur- 
prise and alarm ? But if those whom this controversy impli- 
cates do not perceive, that according to their method of ex- 
hibiting the depravity of man, it is a physical attribute; do they 
see that it certainly is not? 6-eeand /ee/ with that calm and com- 
plete conviction which the light of demonstration produces, 

that the doctrine as they treat it cannot involve any thing of 
that nature ? and that it adjusts itself entirely to all the other 
articles of their faith ? How then is it that when called on 
to vindicate their representations, they so often content 
themselves with the reply ? " We do not pretend to reason 
on the subject. We find the doctrine which we teach in the 
scriptures, and know therefore that it is true." Such is un- 



45 



doubtedly their belief ; but the inquiry is — Is not the con- 
sistency of their views with the word of God, an object 
simply oi belief, not of perception ; a thing taken for granted 
— not ascertained ? 

But is it said ? " Be it so that the depravity of mankind 
is virtually exhibited as a physical attribute — still the error 
is not inculcated in such a manner as to be extensively im- 
bibed, and productive of any very considerable evil. Its 
injurious tendency is intercepted by the truth with which it 
is intermingled." Is it so, then, that truth commands the 
conviction and approbation of men so much more readily 
than error ? and even that truth which is most adapted to 
humble and alarm them, and which comes to them under 
the disadvantages of a virtual denial by their religious in- 
structors — more readily than errors which are inculcated 
as doctrines of revelation, and are adapted to release them 
from the ungrateful feelings of blame and obligation ? But 
what are facts ? If the truths taught in connection with 
the doctrine in question entirely intercept the injurious in- 
fluence it is adapted to exert, how is it that among those on 
whom it is inculcated, so many are found who have a va- 
riety of views and impressions which directly involve this 
doctrine ? Whence is it, that — the testimony of their con- 
sciousness notwithstanding — the ©pinion has found its way 
into the creeds of so many myriads, that mankind are in 
every sense absolutely unable to yield any obedience to the 
law of God? Whence is it, that in certain sections of the 
church so much displeasure and denunciation have been ex- 
cited, when it has been taught, that men can exercise holi- 
ness ? that so far as capacity is concerned no obstacle to it 
whatever exists ? Whence is it, that when the doctrine is 
advanced, that as it regards their physical constitution, 
mankind are not depraved, corrupted, nor infected with any 
thing that renders them obnoxious to the divine disapproba- 
tion, it is viewed as contradicting and subverting the doc- 
trine of the scriptures respecting the character of men ? 



44 



From what cause is it so common a fact, that persons dur- 
ing the period of inquiry and conviction which precedes 
their renovation, are perplexed to reconcile their obliga- 
tions to comply with the Gospel, with their need of the re- 
generating influence of the Divine Spirit ? And how 
comes it to pass, that among the perceptions which flash 
upon their eye in that decisive moment when they catch 
the first glimpse of God in his true character, and the feeling 
spreads over them that he is righteous, and they are vile ; — 
one of the most prominent is, that they are, and always have 
been perfectly able to act in conformity to the divine will ? 
Is it irrational to regard these and other facts of a kindred 
nature, as the consequences of the inculcation of the doc- 
trine in question ? Are they not the effects which might be 
anticipated from the doctrine ? Are they not known to ex- 
ist very extensively, and to be productive, in at least many 
instances, of highly injurious — not to say the most fatal con- 
sequences ? But the unhappy influence with which the in- 
culcation of the doctrine must be fraught, will be made 
more satisfactorily apparent by glancing at some of the 
considerations which show it to be untrue. 



45 



PART SECOND. 



Proofs that the Doctrine is Erroneous. 

It may perhaps seem scarcely necessary to agitate the 
4iiestion, whether the reasonings employed to sustain these 
views of the depravity of mankind, are valid and satisfacto- 
ry ; or to present a formal array of argument to show the er- 
roneousness of the views themselves ? It is believed, how- 
ever, the discussion will not be without interest nor utility : 
not only from the conclusions to which it will lead in regard 
to the nature of those reasonings, and from the stronger 
light in which it will place the impropriety and injurious 
tendency of inculcating the doctrine ; but also from its 
bearings on the views which are to be presented at the close 
of the work. 

I. The great argument employed to sustain the doctrine 
is founded on the sinful actions of mankind. But their unit- 
ing in a course of transgression to the extent to which they 
do, does not demonstrate the existence of any defect in 
their physical constitution rendering them incapable of obe- 
dience. The existence of such a defect cannot be inferred 
from their conduct, at any rate, unless their actions are uni- 
versally disobedient. But it is admitted that multitudes, 
beyond computation — namely, all who are renewed by the 
Spirit of God — do, in innumerable instances, act in confor- 
mity to the divine will. Unless, therefore, it is first proved, 
that the Spirit of God has wrought a change in the physical 



46 



constitutions of all those who ever act obediently, which is 
the cause of the change in their conduct— their uniting in 
transgression to such an extent as they do, no more proves 
the universal existence of such a defect in their physical 
nature, than their uniting in obedience to such an extent as 
they do, demonstrates their universal exemption from such 
a defect. But has it ever been proved that such a change 
is actually wrought in the constitutions of those who are 
renewed ? Can it be proved ? do the Scriptures intimate 
any thing of that nature ? Is there any thing in the con- 
sciousness of God's children demonstrating it ? Is there a 
single fact within the compass of human knowledge from 
which it can be legitimately inferred ? But if no evidence 
whatever exists that such a change is ever effected, what 
proof is furnished by the disobedience of mankind, that their 
nature universally, while unrenewed, is totally incapable — 
from a physical defect — of acting in conformity to the divine 
will ? What evidence appears, but that they have precisely 
the same capacity for obedience, antecedently to regenera- 
tion, as afterwards ; but that the capacity which they exert 
in violating the law of God, is identically that which 
they exert in acting in conformity to it ? Unless, therefore, 
it is first demonstrated, that that portion of the actions 
of mankind which are obedient is not exercised by a 
physical nature of the same kind as that which exerts those 
actions which are disobedient ; it is assuming the thing to 
be proved, to allege the disobedience of men, as demon- 
strative evidence that the nature of man universally, while 
unrenewed, is physically incapable of exercising holiness. 

But the principle on which the argument proceeds carries 
us farther. Until it is proved that a change is wrought in 
-the constitution of all those who ever yield any obedience, 
we are not only not authorized to infer from the disobedience 
of men, that their physical nature is infected with a depra- 
vity, which renders them incapable of holiness ; or which is 
the same thing, which is the cause of their disobedience ; 



47 



but we are bound by all the lawi of just philosophy, not t© 
make such an inference. Why should we infer the existence 
of a thing of which not a particle of evidence is perceived ? 
We cast our eye over the great family of man, and see that 
of the endless multiplicity of actions which they every hour 
exert, one portion are violations of the law of God, and the 
other compliances with it. Now, there not being a shred of 
proof discerned within the sphere of human knowledge, but 
that the physical constitution of those who transgress the di- 
vine law, is precisely like theirs who act in conformity to 
it, — but that theirs who have been regenerated, is identi- 
cally such as it was antecedently to their regeneration, — are 
we not imperatively required by every legitimate rule of 
philosophizing, to regard the constitutions of all, as being — 
so far as this subject is concerned — entirely alike ? In 
other words — to esteem that as being truly the fact, which 
we have no reason whatever to doubt is such ? and therefore 
entirely to reject the doctrine that it is owing to the peculiar 
structure of their physical nature that mankind sin ? If not 
— if even on those subjects which most intimately concern 
our well-being — we are authorized to give the rein to fancy, 
and pronounce things to be true or otherwise as caprice 
happens to dictate, without a shadow of evidence to sustain 
us — there is surely an end to all reasoning, and the distinc- 
tions between right and wrong, which have been imagined 
to be immutable, are annihilated. 

The result of the whole then is, that the great argument 
from the sinful actions of men, to prove the existence of a 
corruption of their nature, — a physical depravity, which is 
the cause of those sinful actions, assumes the thing to be 
established, and is wholly without force. 

II. A subordinate or auxiliary argument to sustain the 
doctrine, is founded on the connection between the first 
transgression of Adam, and the disobedience of men. But 
this is obviously dependent entirely for its propriety on the 
correctness of the former,, and fails with that. For if the 



48 



unholy actions themselves of mankind do not demonstrate 
nor present any evidence that they are physically depraved, 
the fact that their exercising those actions is a consequence 
of the fall, surely cannot. If the manner itself in which 
they act, furnishes nothing to sustain the doctrine, will any 
one imagine the mere occasion of their acting in that manner 
can present any thing for its support ? 

It is believed the reader must be satisfied, that no proof 
is furnished by the actions of men, that their physical con- 
stitutions are depraved. Let their actions then be thrown 
from the view, as having no connection with the question ; 
and whence can it then be proved, that in consequence of 
Adam's fall, all his posterity have derived from him a phy- 
sical depravity ? Can any one see that such a depravity 
pertains to the human constitution ? But who knows any 
thing of the nature of the mind, but from the manner in 
which it acts ? which has now nothing to do with the inquiry. 
Does the volume of Revelation teach the existence of such 
a depravity ? Where ? But this question demands a sepe* 
rate consideration. 

III. Another auxiliary argument is founded on the decla- 
rations of the sacred volume respecting men. Of these 
there are two classes. One which represents men as trans- 
gressing the divine law. This is easily disposed of; for if 
the unholy actions themselves of men are no evidence that 
they are physically depraved, those passages of Scripture 
which merely represent them as exercising those actions, 
of course are not. The other class consists of such as the 
following : " No man can come unto me, except the Father 
which hath sent me draw him." The decision in regard to 
this is equally at hand. It will be admitted that the true 
meaning of these passages is such, that the Most High 
treats mankind in them in a manner entirely consistent with 
that in which he treats them in other parts of his word. 
How then does he treat them in other parts of his word ? as 
though a defect existed in their physical constitutions by 



49 



which they are rendered totally incapable of exercising any 
of those actions which his law prescribes ? Is that the 
manner in which he treats them in requiring them to exert 
those actions? — in pronouncing them supremely guilty? — in 
expressing the most awful indignation at them ? — in threat- 
ening to inflict on them the most appalling punishment for 
not complying with his requirements ? Will any one from 
these passages venture to affirm that he does not, in his mo- 
ral administration at large, conduct toward mankind as be- 
ing precisely such creatures as they are ? that he has insti- 
tuted a system of legislation over them which has no more 
adaptation to their nature than it has to that of brutes and 
inanimate objects ? But let the Spirit of truth decide the 
inquiry. " It is accepted according to that a man hath, and not 
according to that he hath not." But if this is the great 
principle on which the Most High proceeds in the imposi- 
tion of laws, it is manifest that mankind possess all the pow- 
ers necessary to the performance of every action he re- 
quires them to exercise. As then the Most High in all the 
measures of his administration proceeds on the ground that 
mankind possess all those powers, it cannot be that in the 
passages to which this argument relates, he treats them as 
though entirely destitute of them. What then is the mean- 
ing of those passages ? Certainly not that men are physical- 
ly unable to exercise holiness ; but simply that they do not 
choose to. 

It may be added, moreover, as none can have failed to 
observe, nor to hear offered in explanation of these pas- 
sages, that the use here ascribed to the terms to which 
the discussion relates, is common in regard to other subjects, 
and is understood with as little difficulty as when they are 
employed with any other meaning. 

These arguments, it is believed, involve all which are 
ever employed to support the doctrine under consideration; 
and they, the readtr perceives, are but different forms of 

i 



50 

one, founded on the sinful actions of men. Having seen 
that the doctrine has never been proved to be true ; it is 
time to proceed to some of the considerations which show 
it to be erroneous. 

IV. It is contradicted by the testimony of conscience. 
The mind is so formed, that it never feels blame for not 
acting in a manner in which it is conscious it has no power 
to act. That feeling never springs up in it, except for ac- 
tions which it has a conviction it was able to avoid. Do the 
blind ever feel blame for not seeing ? Is it not absolutely 
impossible that they should? and that any others should in 
analagous circumstances ? The great principle then on 
which all the operations of conscience proceed is, that — so 
far as this discussion is concerned — capacity is the founda- 
tion and measure of obligation ; that a being is guilty for vio- 
lating a law, — so far as this question goes — simply because 
he was able to avoid its violation. Reader, suppose in or- 
der to convince you of the fact, the Most High were to 
require you to create a material object. You violate the 
command. Why? I have not the requisite power, you 
reply, to comply with it. But you are to blame. Not at 
all, you answer. What is the reason ? Because I am not 
able to create such an object. I revere my Creator, and 
desire to do his will, but this act is totally beyond the sphere 
of my capacity : Is there a being who does not see that my 
decision is right ? But look at the reason that you feel per- 
fectly blameless. It is simply because the act lies above 
your power. Let the requisite power be thrown into your 
constitution, and you will instantly feel to blame for not ex- 
ercising it. The result then is, God has formed the minds of 
men in such a manner, that they cannot feel to blame for 
not doing any thing but what they are conscious they are 
able to do. 

What now is the bearing of this great fact on the subject 
in controversy ? On the one hand, it is indisputable that 
mankind do— at least in innumerable instances — feel guilty 



51 



for not obeying the law of God. It is demonstrated, there- 
fore, that they are perfectly conscious — whatever their 
creed may be — of being able to obey it. On the other hand, 
the doctrine in question teaches, that from a defect in their 
physical constitution, they are absolutely unable to exercise 
a single act which the law of God requires. Whose testi- 
mony then is to be regarded as true ? That conscience de- 
cides as it does, is the work of God, Are its decisions er- 
roneous ? Has God formed the mind in such a manner 
that it cannot feel to blame when it ought ? that it necessa- 
rily exculpates when it should condemn itself ? that its de- 
cisions therefore must inevitably be inconsistent with the 
divine rights ? Are those to whom this controversy relates 
prepared to adopt such conclusions? If not — if what the 
human mind proceeds upon, in all its feelings of blame, be a 
fact — that men are completely able to act in compliance 
with all the requirements of the divine law ; then it follows 
that the doctrine of a physical depravity, which represents 
them as wholly incapable of obedience, is entirely errone- 
ous. 

V. It is contradicted by the manner in which the Most 
High conducts toward mankind in his moral administration. 
This topic has already been partially considered ; but it is 
worthy of farther attention. 

It will be admitted, that God conducts toward mankind 
as being precisely such creatures as they are. If not,, 
where is his justice or wisdom ? Is there any wisdom or 
justice in treating beings as though they were essentially 
different from what they are ? Is there any goodness or 
rectitude in imposing laws on brutes which are adapted only 
to men ? or on men, which are adapted only to the ener- 
gies of archangels ? God, then, who is infinitely benevo- 
lent, just, and wise, treats all mankind, as being in regard to 
their physical nature, precisely such as they are. How 
then does he conduct toward them in his moral govern- 
ment ? As though they were absolutely destitute of all ca- 



52 



parity whatever for acting in conformity to his require- 
ments ? as though they were under no obligation to yield 
him any obedience? as though they stood, and must for- 
ever stand exculpated from all blame for not complying 
with the injunctions of his law. No answer surely can be 
necessary to these inquiries. Inasmuch then as mankind 
are treated by the Most High in the requirements and sanc- 
tions of his moral government, as though they possessed 
all the power requisite for the course of action which his 
law prescribes ; they do in fact possess that power. The 
doctrine in question, therefore, which denies it to them, is 
erroneous. 

VI. If the doctrine in controversy were true, it would 
lead to the most appalling conclusions in regard to the divine 
administration. This topic is partially involved in the two 
preceding arguments, but demands a remark or two more. 

If such a depravity as the doctrine describes, exists in the 
minds of men, their violations of the law of God are of course 
unavoidable. They are events over which their wills have 
no preventive control. Their constitutions are incapable 
of any other moral action than that which is a transgression 
of the divine law. They cannot escape sinning, but by 
ceasing to act. But if such is the state of things, what con- 
clusions are to be formed in regard to the divine govern- 
ment? Is it indeed totally unadapted to the nature of man? 
employed in endeavouring to elicit from him a course of ac- 
tion of which he is utterly incapable ? Are its penal sanctions 
unrighteous ? and their infliction in this world and the next 
undeserved ? In short, is it neither characterized by grace, 
wisdom, nor even justice ? Those whom the discussion 
implicates, will undoubtedly recoil from such results, with 
as much energy as others. They must then pronounce the 
doctrine they inculcate to be erroneous. 

VII. If the doctrine were true, and the reasonings em- 
ployed to sustain it sound, they would lead us to expect that 
men, on being regenerated, would exercise uninterrupted 



53 



obedience to the divine will. The doctrine represents tl K 
cause of their disobedience antecedently to renovation, ag 
lying entirely within themselves ; and consisting in such a 
structure of their nature — denominated " a depraved dis- 
position," that every motive brought to bear on them must 
infallibly propel them to sin, — that they are physically in- 
capable of any other species of action under a moral in- 
fluence than that which violates the law. Of course, w hen 
regeneration takes place, that defect is removed from their 
constitution, and its place supplied by a " new disposition" 
precisely opposite in its nature. How happens it then that 
after this, they do not uninterruptedly exercise holiness ? 
If the reasonings in regard to the old and new disposition 
are correct, there can no longer exist any foundation in their 
constitutions for unholy affections ; — nothing on which mo- 
tives can act as incentives to sin, — every species of moral 
influence brought to bear on them must infallibly lead them 
to the exercise of holiness. They in short become physi- 
cally incapable of any other kind of action. But are they 
so in fact ? Are modern believers perfectly holy ? Were 
the Reformers ? Was Peter or David ? If not, the doctrine 
which goes to represent them as such cannot be correct. 

VIII. On the whole then it appears, not only that the de- 
pravity in question does not pertain to the human constitu- 
tion, but that it cannot. It is impossible to conceive of 
man's being capable of sinning, without his being at the same 
time equally capable of obedience. To sin is to violate an 
obligation ; but as has been shown — no obligation to obey a 
law can exist, any farther than the capacity necessary to a 
compliance with its injunctions is possessed. 

But perhaps even those whom the discussion most inti- 
mately concerns, will regard it as unnecessary — admitting 
that they have in fact inculcated the doctrine in question — ■ 
to employ a formal array of reasoning to prove it to be er- 
roneous ; — will claim that they cannot — at least as a body — 
be imagined to have held it — discerning all the results to 



54 



which it is adapted to carry them ; — that when separated 
from the contradictory points of beliefwith which it has 
been associated, and from the plausible but erroneous rea- 
sonings under which it has lurked, and which have shrouded 
much of its real character, and tnrown over it the aspect of 
truth ; — when disentangled from this factitious drapery, and 
presented in all the inherent and revolting deformity with 
which it is truly fraught, — they reject it with as much energy 
of feeling as others can. The conviction is cherished that 
such is undoubtedly the fact ; and it yields high satisfaction, 
both from the favourable light in which it places their views 
in inculcating the doctrine, and from the pledge it gives that 
they are prepared to go along entirely in the adoption of 
the conclusions which are now to be drawn, and which re- 
sult from what has been established. 



5a 



PART THIRD. 



Scriptural Viezvs respecting the Nature, Condition, and Cha- 
racter of Mankind as Moral Agents* 

I. There is nothing in the constitution of man on his 
coming into being, or at any subsequent period, which of 
itself — every thing else being thrown out of consideration — 
lays any foundation of a certainty what kind of actions he 
will exercise when placed under a moral influence : nothing 
from which it can be infallibly inferred that he will exercise 
sin instead of holiness, or holiness instead of sin ; nor 
which can even present any more probability of his assum- 
ing the one character than the other. 

This results from his having precisely the same capacity 
for exercising the one species of actions, as the other. 
Possessing identically the same capacity for obedience as 
for transgression, can any one imagine that by simply look- 
ing at his capacity, any certainty or probability can be dis- 
cerned of his exercising the one, rather than the other ? 
Can a given capacity for sin constitute any certainty or 
probability that sin will be exercised any more than pre- 
cisely the same capacity for holiness forms a certainty or 
probability that holiness will be exercised ? 

Or to approach the point through a different avenue. 
No depravity, corruption, taint, nor any other defect what- 



56 



ever of that nature, pertains to the constitution of man, 

rendering him physically incapable of acting in conformity 
to the divine will, or making his committing sin in any sense 
an infallible result. Nothing whatever exists in it therefore 
which must by a necessity of its nature prove a cause of 
sin ; nothing then which of course operates to the produc- 
tion of sin ; nothing therefore which constitutes a tendency 
to sin ; nothing then, in short, which forms any more cer- 
tainty or probability that he will exercise that species of 
actions which is evil, than that which is morally excel* 
lent. 

If any thing pertained to his constitution which of itself 
— every thing else being excluded from consideration — 
formed a proper ground for the conclusion that he would 
sin, instead of yielding obedience, it would constitute pre- 
cisely the defect which the doctrine that has been discuss- 
ed ascribes to him; and carry along with it all the revolting 
conclusions which that doctrine goes to authorize. 

But this the reader perceives, is after all, nothing more 
than the question in regard to the capacity of man. The 
medium through which such a defect would operate to pre- 
vent his exercising holiness, must of course be that of in- 
capacitating him for that species of action. If it left him 
with precisely the same capacity for obedience as for 
transgression, then, as before remarked, it would be im- 
possible to discover any more certainty or probability of his 
assuming the one character than the other. 

Nothing then pertains to the physical nature of man 
which of itself presents any certainty or probability in what 
manner he will act, when placed under a moral influence. 
It has no tendency whatever one way or the other; nothing 
partaking in any sense of depravity, corruption, or guilt, or 
making any approximation toward them ; nothing which is 
in any sense offensive to God ; but, on the contrary, it is per- 
fectly acceptable to him ; as free from every odious defect, 
and as completely the object of his complacency as were 



67 



the physical constitutions of the first pair when created — 
as are the natures of angels. 

This is undoubtedly a very different doctrine from that 
which is ordinarily inculcated; but there can be no medium 
between it, and that which ascribes to man a depravity ren- 
dering him physically incapable of exercising any holiness. 
If his physical nature has no depravity in it, there can be 
nothing in it which necessarily tends to sin: if nothing 
evil pertains to it, it cannot but be an object of God's com- 
placency. 

And if any other proof of it were necessary, is it 
not presented by the consideration that God creates the 
physical constitution of every individual of the human fami- 
ly ? Is it said ? " Mankind ever since the first pair come 
into existence by propagation, and it takes place by the 
laws of nature that their constitutions are such as they are." 
But are those second causes fraught with omnipotence and in- 
dependence? and are they the voluntary authors of these ef- 
fects? Is he a mere idle spectator of the events which take 
place in connexion with their agency ? Besides, who created 
those second causes ? Is not God as truly and directly the au- 
thor of all these effects, as though those causes never inter- 
vened 7 Nothingsurelybut the purest atheism canever — per- 
ceiving the results which it legitimately involves — think of to- 
lerating any other doctrine. God therefore creates the 
physical nature of every individual of the great family of man, 
and makes it precisely what it is. Can any reasoning then be 
necessary to show that nothing can pertain to it that is of it- 
self evil ? nothing but what is entirely an object of his 
complacency ? 

II. Mankind are as able in all instances to exercise those 
acts which the divine law designates as their duty, as to ex- 
ercise those which are violations of that law. 

This results from there not being anything in their physical 
constitutions which, of itself, has any more tendency to sin thaa 

8 



68 



to holiness, — or which constitutes any more likelihood of their 
exercising the one species of action, than the other. If 
their natures have nothing in them which of itself gives them 
any more tendency to sin, than to holiness, nor constitutes 
any more probability of their exercising the one species of 
action than the other, they of course can have no more 
adaptation to the exertion of sinful actions than those which 
are holy ; and therefore no more capacity for the one than 
the other. The various attributes with which they are en- 
dowed and which constitute their nature, — so far as this dis- 
cussion goes — can be nothing more than the mere powers of 
moral agency, — a simple capacity for moral action, without 
any consideration whether it is right or wrong. Every pro- 
perty lodged in their constitutions must be as completely 
adapted to be exerted in compliance with the divine law, 
as in violation of it ; and of course as capable of being ex- 
erted in the one kind of action as the other. 

Further proof of this great fact is seen : 

1st. In the consideration, that the Most High in all the mea- 
sures of his moral administration, proceeds upon it as a fact that 
mankind are completely capable of exercising all the actions 
whichhe prescribes to them. In requiring them to act in a given 
manner, he treats them as possessing all the capacity neces- 
sary for acting in that manner. There is no medium there- 
fore between ascribing to them that capacity, and charging 
his government with being totally unsuited to their nature ; 
that is, denying that it bears the marks either of perfect 
knowledge, benevolence, or even justice. 

2d. In the consideration that all the operations of con- 
science proceed on it as a fact that men are perfectly able 
to fulfil every obligation which they violate. The principle — 
so far as this discussion is concerned — on which all its feel- 
ings of blame take place is, that a being's capacity to obey 
a law, is the foundation and measure of his obligation to 
obey it. Let an act be required of men which they are 
conscious lies wholly beyond the sphere of their powers, — 



59 



and they are as completely incapable of feeling any obligation 
to comply with the requirement, as they are of performing 
the act itself, A complete capacity for discharging all their 
obligations must therefore be ascribed to mankind ; or it 
must be denied that either the law of God, or the operations 
of conscience, present any expression of what their obliga- 
tions are. In other words, there is no medium between the 
ascription to them of such a capacity, and the denial that 
there is any known standard of obligation, or ascertained 
distinction between right and wrong. 

III. All the sin of man lies in his exerting a nature — good 
in itself — in a wrong manner. 

If nothing whatever of evil exists in his physical nature, 
it follows of course that every thing of that kind pertaining 
to him, must lie exclusively in the manner in which he ex- 
erts that nature. 

Or to go farther : No species of the feelings or affections 
of man, whose foundation is laid in his physical constitution, 
is in itself — without any consideration of the manner inwhich 
it is indulged — of course and necessarily sinful ; but his sin 
lies in his exercising affections — in their kind good — in a 
wrong manner. If nothing exists in his constitution which 
in itself — all other considerations being set aside — constitutes 
a tendency to sin / then of course no foundation whatever 
can exist there of any species of affection which is ne- 
cessarily sinful ; and therefore no species of the affections 
which he exercises — without any regard being had to the 
manner in which it is exercised — is in itself and necessarily 
sinful. Thus, for example, that species of affection deno- 
minated desire, is not of course and necessarily sinful : it 
may be, and sometimes is holy; it is sinful only when exer- 
cised in a particular mariner : love is not of course and ne- 
cessarily sinful : it may be and sometimes is holy : it is sin- 
ful only when exercised in a particular manner : and so of 
the other affections. 



60 



This proposition — a single remark it is believed must 
convince every one — expresses a great fact with which all 
are familiar, and on which all proceed in their decisions re- 
specting the moral nature of actions. When — without any 
designation of the manner in which the affection is exer- 
cised — it is simply announced that a being exercises desire, 
love, aversion, hatred, fear, anger, joy, sorrow, or any other 
species of affection, of which a foundation exists in the con- 
stitution of man ; does any one — with only that fact before 
him — feel competent to draw any conclusion in regard to 
the moral nature of the exercise ? Does not the complete 
conviction exist in every mind that at that point nothing 
whatever is known respecting it ; that nothing whatever 
can be ascertained in regard to it, until it is seen in what 
precise mode the affection is exerted? But why does this 
take place, but because it is intuitively seen that it does not 
follow, of course and necessarily, that a being sins who ex- 
ercises desire, love, hatred, joy, or any other kind of affec- 
tion which has its foundation in the physical constitution ? 
that it is felt that all those affections may be exercised in 
compliance with the law of God, as well as in violation of it? 
and that their moral nature depends entirely on the manner 
in which they are indulged ? 

Such is indubitably the fact ; and accordingly the law of 
God, in delineating the obligations of men, invariably pro- 
ceeds on it as a fact. It never prohibits absolutely — in all 
cases whatsoever — the exercise of any of the species of af- 
fection which have their foundation in the physical consti- 
tution, — such as desire, love, hatred, fear, joy, — but em- 
ploys itself solely in delineating the manner in which they 
are to be exerted ; that is, designating the objects to- 
ward which they are to be exercised, and the degrees 
to which they are to be carried. Its language is, " Thou shalt 
love the Lord thy God;" here is an object toward which 
the affection is to be exercised ; — " with all thy heart 
and here the degree to which it is to be carried ; — t£ and thy 



61 



neighbour as thyself ;" — and here another object, with the 
limit to which the affection is to be cherished toward it. 
" Love not the world, neither the things that are in the 
world ;" — that is supremely, " for every creature of God 
is good, and nothing to be refused, if it be received with 
thanksgiving." " Hate the evil, and love the good." 
" Trust in the Lord with all thy heart, and lean not to 
thine own understanding." " Fear not them [supremely] 
which kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul, but 
rather fear him which is able to destroy both soul and body 
in hell." And it is on the same principle that every precept 
in the sacred volume relating to the affections proceeds. 

These views are farther confirmed by the fact, that there 
are many affections which may be lawfully and virtuously 
cherished to a certain extent, but which beyond that be- 
come sinful. Thus for one to love himself as his neigh- 
bour, is authorized by the law of God ; but to love one's 
self supremely is the height of sin. In like manner to 
gratify hunger and thirst to a certain point is temperance, 
but beyond it becomes gluttony and drunkenness. 

As then none of the kinds of affection which the physi- 
cal constitution of man is fitted to exercise, are from their 
nature — without any consideration of the manner in which 
they are exerted — necessarily sinful, it follows that his sin 
lies exclusively in the manner in which he exercises 
them. 

IV. The Scriptural doctrine of depravity has no refer- 
ence whatever to the physical constitution ; — it relates ex- 
clusively to the actions of man. ai^ d simply expresses the 
fact, that while unrenewed, he never exercises holiness : or 
in other words, that while left without the renovating influ- 
ence of the Divine Spirit, all the moral actions which he ex- 
erts, are violations of the divine law. 

This is not more manifestly in accordance with the posi- 
tions which have already been established, than it is with 
every passage in the word of God that relates to the subject. 



62 



Let the reader turn to the sacred volume, and he will see 
that the only mode in which it delineates the character of 
man, is that of stating the manner in which he acts. Its 
language is, " Every imagination of the thoughts of his heart 
[is] only evil continually." " There is none righteous, no 
not one. There is none that under standeth, there is none 
that seeketh after God. They are all gone out of the way ; 
they are together become unprofitable ; there is none that 
doethgood, no not one. Their throat is an open sepulchre ; 
[breathes out putrescence and contagion ;] with their tongues 
they have used deceit ; the poison of asps is under their 
lips ; [their language is fraught with the deadliest malice ;] 
whose mouth is full of cursing and bitterness ; their feet are 
swift to shed blood ; destruction and misery are in their ways; 
and the way of peace have they not known ; there is no fear 
of God before their eyes." " Being filled with all unright- 
eousness, fornication, wickedness, covetousness, maliciousness, 
full of envy, murder, debate, deceit, malignity ; whisperers, 
backbiters, haters of God, despiteful, proud, boasters, invent- 
ors of evil things, disobedient to parents, without understand- 
ing, covenant breakers, without natural affection, implacable, 
unmerciful." 

The reader perceives thatnot one of these expressions has 
any relation whatever to the physical constitution of the soul; 
they are employed exclusively in describing the course of 
conduct which man pursues, — the species of actions which 
he exerts. And such is the fact with all others in the sacred 
volume having any reference to the subject. Such, indeed, 
must necessarily be the fact; for as the word of God pre- 
scribes nothing whatever as a duty, but actions, it of course 
cannot designate any thing else than actions as a violation 
of obligation. 

Is it said? " The scriptures represent the heart as deceitful 
above all things, and desperately wicked." But what is it 
to be deceitful ? Any thing else than to exercise deceit ? 



63 



Can a being be called deceitful, who has never exercised any 
deceit ? And if not, can any one be denominated so for 
any other reason than because he has exercised it? And 
what is it to be desperately wicked ? Any thing else than 
to exercise excessive wickedness ? That passage then and 
all others of the same kind, do nothing more than describe 
the manner in which the mind of man acts. 

The scriptural doctrine of depravity, then, relates solely 
to the actions of man — not at all to his physical nature. 

Can any one fail to see that the fact is far otherwise with 
at least the great mass of the theological works relating to 
the subject with which the world abounds, whose pages pre- 
sent so much respecting a " depravity and corruption of 
nature," — " a nature that cannot but be odious and abomi- 
nable to God" antecedently to any of its actions, — " an 
odious and detestable tendency of nature that is prevalent 
and effectual 5 ' to sin, — and a " vicious" "disposition which 
is the foundation" of all sinful exercises ? 

V. Temptation is the sole cause of man's sinning. 
This results of course from what has been established. If no- 
thing exists in his physical nature which— contemplated apart 
from the moral influence brought to bear on him — goes at all 
to determine in what manner he will act in regard to his obli- 
gations, it must of necessity be determined entirely by that 
moral influence : and that that influence leads to transgres- 
sion instead of obedience, must result of course from its be- 
ing on the whole a temptation to sin, instead of an induce- 
ment to holiness. It is the intervention of temptation sole- 
ly that turns the scale. Were that excluded, the whole 
course of moral action would be in conformity to the law of 
God. 

Nothing can be plainer than this. It is demonstra- 
ted by every consideration that has any relation to the sub- 
ject. Can any one imagine a being to sin, without being 
under any temptation to it ? or for any other reason than 
because he is tempted to it ? to pursue a course of conduct 



64 



without any inducement whatever ? Is it not the height of 
absurdity to suppose a being to exert volitions without any 
motives ? But to glance at two or three of the considera- 
tions which verify these views : 

1st. It will be admitted, that every moral act of the mind 
is exerted towards an object. Desire, love, hatred, and 
other affections, from the earliest stages of their existence, 
up to their termination in finished action, are never exerci- 
sed except toward some specific object lying before the eye 
of the mind. It is settled, then, that the reason that the 
mind voluntarily exercises its affections toward that specific 
class of objects which it does, and toward no others, is, that 
those are the objects, and no others, that come under its no- 
tice. It cannot desire, love, or hate an object which does 
not pass within the range of its perception. 

But it is equally certain, that it is owing to the influence 
those objects exert on the mind, that it voluntarily exercises 
its affections toward them, in the manner it does. It will 
be admitted, that the mind never exercises desire, or com- 
placency toward any objects but those which yield, or have 
yielded it enjoyment, or which it perceives, or imagines it 
perceives are adapted to yield it enjoyment ; nor on the 
other hand, is ever indifferent or averse to any objects but 
those which it has ascertained do not, or which it imagines 
are not adapted to afford it enjoyment, or at least to such a 
degree as other objects. But that being the fact, it is mani- 
fest that it is in consequence of what it has experienced, or 
perceived, or imagined it perceived in regard to those ob- 
jects, that it voluntarily exercises its affections toward 
them in the manner in which it does ; that is, regards them 
with desire or indifference, complacency or aversion. In 
other words, it exercises its affections toward them in the 
mariner in which it does, on account of the effects which 
they have produced in it ; and that is on account of the in- 
fluence they have exerted on it. 



65 



The influence which those objects exert undoubtedly de- 
pends much, 

First. On the connexion in which they occur; or the 
circumstances under which they come before the mind. 
Food may in health excite desire, and disgust in sickness. 
Wealth may be an object of desire in the likelihood of con- 
tinued life, and of disregard in the prospect of immediate 
death. And death, which when contemplated as a remote 
event, scarce throws a shade of concern over the mind, at 
the door may shake it with alarm. 

Secondly. On the length of their continuance before the 
eye, and the intenseness with which they are viewed. And 
these result again partly from the circumstances under 
which they come before the mind. Death, when known to 
be a near event, will both present itself more frequently, 
and maintain itself longer before the eye, than when re- 
garded as probably at a distance. But they arise chiefly 
from the choice of the mind, which voluntarily selects al- 
most all the important objects of its attention, and deter- 
mines both the duration and energy of the view with which 
it regards them. 

The reason then that the mind voluntarily exercises 
its affections toward those objects which it does, is that they 
are the objects which pass within the range of its percep- 
tion, and its exercising its affections toward them in such a 
manner as it does, results from the nature of the influence 
which they exert on it ; or in other words, the reason that 
it sins under that influence is, that on the whole it is a temp- 
tation to sin, instead of an inducement to holiness. 

But why, after all, are those objects temptations to sin ? 
Summarily because they are adapted, or are imagined to be 
adapted, to excite some of those species of pleasurable or 
painful feeling or action of which the mind is capable. 
But this topic is worthy of farther attention, and it is be- 

9 



66 



lieved the following considerations place it in a satisfactory 
light. 

First. A foundation is laid in the physical constitution 
for a great variety of both pleasurable and painful affec- 
tion, exercise, or action. 

Secondly. There is in the external universe an endless 
multiplicity of objects adapted, when brought in contact 
with the physical nature, to excite those kinds of feeling or 
action. 

Thirdly. Those objects, when thus brought in contact 
with it, are motives to voluntary action. Thus food is a 
motive to eat, because when brought in contact with the 
organs of taste and digestion, it excites one of those species 
of pleasurable affection or action. 

Fourthly. None of those kinds of affection or action — 
as has been shown — are of course and at all events sinful ; 
but their moral character depends on the manner in which 
they are voluntarily cherished ; as for example the indul- 
gence of the sensations food excites, is within certain limits 
lawful ; it is only when carried beyond that it bears the name 
of gluttony. 

Fifthly. All holiness and sin lie in the voluntary affec- 
tions. External actions are mere consequences of those 
affections, modes of exhibiting them, or expressions of 
them ; and have a moral character only in that respect. 

Sixthly. The mind voluntarily selects at least a great pro- 
portion of the objects toward which it directs its attention, 
and exercises its moral feelings; and in all instances deter- 
mines both whether it cherishes at all, and the degree to 
which it cherishes its affections toward these objects : Or 
in other words, decides by choice in regard both to its in- 
dulging at all, and to the extent to which it indulges in the 
pleasures they are adapted to afford. 

Seventhly. A motive is an inducement to holiness, whose 
influence excites the mind to act in conformity to its obliga- 



67 



tions ; and a temptation to sin, whose influence excites it to 
act in violation of those obligations. 

Eighthly. The mind is worthy of praise or blame for the 
manner in which it acts under the influence of motives, be- 
cause it acts in that manner voluntarily ; that is decides 
by choice in regard both to its indulging at all, and to the 
degree to which it indulges in the gratifications they are 
adapted to yield. 

With these views then it is apparent, both that it is in 
consequence of the moral influence under which they act, 
that mankind violate the law of God ; and that they are 
blameable for that violation. 

2d. This view is confirmed by the consideration that all 
the measures of God's moral administration employed to 
prevent men from sinning, proceed upon the ground that 
temptation is the sole reason that they sin ; for they all ope- 
rate to the end for which they are designed, solely by coun- 
teracting temptation ; or in other words, presenting induce- 
ments to holiness. How does the revelation itself of his 
will operate as a mean to holiness, except by the induce- 
ments it presents to pursue that course of conduct, rather 
than any other ? And more especially, how are the sanctions 
of that will means of holiness, except by the inducements 
they exhibit to act in the manner prescribed, and by the 
checks they throw on whatever temptations may exist to 
pursue a different course of conduct ? But above all, why 
are such modes of expressing and enforcing that will em- 
ployed, unless it be on the principle under consideration 1 
If there is no reference of that nature, why is any thing more 
done than a mere authoritative statement of what actions 
are right and wro-ng, and of the consequences which are to 
attend the course of conduct pursued? Why does that will 
come to us, not only as a simple requirement dictated by 
rightful authority, but also in the shape, at one time of an 
invitation emanating from paternal tenderness ? and at ano- 
ther, of an entreaty flowing from infinite love toward us. 



68 



and concern for our welfare ? Why are we urged to yield 
obedience to it, not only on the ground that it dictates what 
our obligations require, but also on one page of the sacred 
volume, because it is the will of the infinite and all-perfect 
Being who created, upholds and blesses us ; and on another, 
because it delineates the only path that can conduct us to 
happiness ? And why moreover, except it be on this prin- 
ciple, are its sanctions presented in such varied and peculiar 
forms ? Why are the rewards of obedience — the glories of 
the resurrection body, the splendours of the heavenly world, 
and the perfection of its happiness — so often and glowingly 
delineated ; — and the punishments of sin so frequently dwelt 
upon and presented under the most appalling imagery that 
the elements and sufferings of this world can furnish ? 

Does not the moral governour manifestly throw all this 
drapery around himself and the great realities of the invisi- 
ble world, solely for the purpose of attracting the attention 
of mankind, and securing their regard to his will ? And is 
it not obviously with the same reference that he has insti- 
tuted ordinances, adjusted the discipline of his providence, 
and especially instituted a ministry ? — that his will might 
come to men under the advantages of a direct appeal, of an 
association with sensible objects, and of an enforcement by 
all those sympathies of the human breast, and passions, and 
tones of voice, and other instruments of persuasion, which, 
from the structure of our nature, give to truth, in the com- 
mon intercourse of man with man, the easiest and surest 
sway over the heart ? And finally, is it not manifestly with 
the same reference, that when he leads a mind to repent- 
ance, he employs these means in their highest degree ? that 
he then pours his voice into the soul through all these chan- 
nels, and fills it with the views his word exhibits ? that he 
draws aside, as it were, the veil from the invisible world, and 
concentrates the whole attention on its realities, and their 
relations to itself ? Is not the direct and sole tendency of 
all this simply to cut off the access of temptation ? to curtai\ 



69 



and extinguish its power, and throw the whole weight of in- 
ducement on the side of obedience ? 

What then are the conclusions we are to form from this 
great feature of God's moral government ? Will any one 
venture to pronounce this stupendous array of means, to be 
nothing more than an useless appendage to the divine ad- 
ministration ? to be without any adaptation to the end for 
which it is professedly employed ? Must not the conviction 
fill every mind that the reason of his bringing this vast sys- 
tem of machinery to bear on the soul is, that the manner in 
which the end to be attained is to be accomplished, is pre- 
cisely that in which these means are adapted to accomplish 
it ? namely, by diminishing the temptations to sin, and aug- 
menting the inducements to holiness. 

3d. It is on the same principle that mankind proceed in 
all their efforts to prevent their fellow men from sin, and lead 
them to virtue. All the measures employed by human go- 
vernments for that end, are founded on it. What means do 
they ever devise for the prevention of crime, that are not 
employed simply in counteracting temptations to it, and mul- 
tiplying inducements to virtue ? In what other way does 
the security of life, of property, and of reputation, operate- 
to that end ? In what other manner does the forfeiture of 
reputation, of property, and of liberty, tend to promote it I 
And what other adaptation for its attainment have prisons 
and fetters, the scourge and the scaffold ? 

It is on this principle that all the friends of human happi- 
ness act, whether in a united or single capacity, in all their 
efforts to arrest the ravages of crime, and promote the pro- 
gress of virtue. It lies at the foundation of all domestic 
government, and constitutes, in short, the secret of all the 
moral influence, of whatever kind it be, which men ever ex- 
ert on each other. What are reasoning, rhetoric, oratory, 
the whole system of the means, and the whole art of persua- 
sion at the bar, in the pulpit, in the hall of legislation, through 
every scene of human intercourse, but instruments employ- 



70 

ed to influence the conduct of mankind on the simple princi- 
ple, that the method of leading them to a given train of ac- 
tion is, to fill their eye with inducements to act in that man- 
ner, and exclude temptation to any other course of conduct? 

What then is the bearing of these important facts ? Is 
this grand contrivance for influencing the conduct of man- 
kind predicated upon just views of human nature ? and is it 
employed with success ? Or is it founded in error ? and 
have mankind deceived themselves for near six thousand 
years in imagining that the order and happiness of society 
are, in some degree at least, the result of laws and their 
sanctions ? and that the arts of the statesman, the orator, 
andthe logician, are atonce the noblest instruments of human 
usefulness, and the noblest monuments of human genius ? 

4th. It is on the same principle that the malignant influence 
of the Adversary proceeds. He gained a victory over our 
first mother through the medium of temptation, and attempt- 
ed to triumph in the same manner over the Son of God. 

What now are the conclusions to which these several 
considerations carry us ? It has been seen that the posi- 
tion in question results from what had been before estab- 
lished ; that it accords with the manner in which we are 
conscious of being affected by the agency of motives ; and 
finally that it is verified by all the methods employed to ex- 
ert an influence over the actions of men by the allwise au- 
thor of revelation and providence, by mankind themselves, 
and by that subtle and malicious being who exerts his 
agency in endeavouring to spread and perpetuate the ra- 
vages of sin. On the other hand, the rejection of these 
views is fraught with the most fatal results, not only in re- 
gard to all human knowledge, but in relation to the divine 
government. Must not the most thoughtless glance at the 
subject impress the conviction on every mind, that a prin- 
ciple which thus accords with all its own and all human ex- 
perience, on which all the moral influence in our world is 



71 



predicated, and which solves all the moral phenomena in the 
universe does and must indubitably correspond with fact ? 

VI. The manner in which the fall of Adam proved a 
cause of the disobedience of his posterity, was simply by 
occasioning their subjection to temptation. 

If, according to the conclusion which has just been 
drawn, temptation is the sole cause that mankind sin, it fol- 
lows of course that the only manner in which the fall of 
Adam can have proved a cause of their disobedience is, that 
of occasioning their subjection to that temptation. There 
is moreover no medium between adopting this position, 
and embracing the doctrine that a depravation of the phy- 
sical nature of man, rendering it incapable of holiness, 
took place in consequence of the first transgression. The 
fall must plainly have occasioned the disobedience of man- 
kind, either by rendering them physically incapable of any 
other species of action; or else — leaving their capacity as 
it would have been had the forbidden fruit never been 
eaten — simply by throwing them under such a moral influ- 
ence, as induces them to transgress. In other words, it 
must have taken place either through the medium of a phy- 
sical cause, or of a moral influence. The first, it has been 
demonstrated, cannot have been the medium ; it must there- 
fore have been the last. 

This view is sustained by all that is known on the subject 
either from human experience, or the volume of revela- 
tion. What bearing the experience of mankind has on it, is 
seen from the discussion of that topic under the last head, 
when it appeared that all their agency — in whatever sphere 
they exert it, — by which they influence the moral conduct 
of each other, is employed simply in throwing inducements 
to act in the manner desired before the eye, and removing 
or counteracting temptations to any other course of ac- 
tion. As far then as human experience extends, there is 
no other medium known of influencing the voluntary ac- 
tions of mankind, than that of moral suasion. 



72 



The pages of revelation yield this view equal corrobora- 
tion by all they teach on the subject. 

1st. By the fact, that — as has been shown — all the means 
employed by the moral government of God to influence the 
voluntary actions of men, are the means of moral suasion. 
Their whole agency is expended in counteracting tempta- 
tion, by presenting inducements to holiness. So far there- 
fore as that goes, it appears that no other medium is em- 
ployed by the Most High to influence the conduct of men. 

2d. By the statements which the scriptures present, in 
regard to the influence of the first transgression on the con- 
dition of mankind. The consequences which God announced 
to the first pair — immediately after the fall — were to result 
to them from their transgression, relate exclusively to their 
external circumstances, " Unto the woman he said, I will 
greatly multiply thy sorrow and thy conception ; in sorrow 
shalt thou bring forth children, and thy desire shall be 
to thy husband, and he shall rule over thee. And unto 
Adam he said, Because thou hast hearkened unto the voice 
of thy wife, and hast eaten of the tree of which I com- 
manded thee saying, thou shalt not eat of it, cursed is the 
ground for thy sake, in sorrow shalt thou eat of it all the 
days of thy life. Thorns also and thistles shall it bring 
forth to thee ; and thou shalt eat the herb of the field : In 
the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread till thou return 
unto the ground ; for out of it wast thou taken ; for dust 
thou art, and unto dust shalt thou return." Can any one 
fail to see that the consequences here enumerated consti- 
tute nothing more than a change in their external condition, 
of such a nature as subjected them to want, toil, pain, sor- 
row, dependence on each other, and at length death ? Where 
is there the remotest allusion to any alteration in the physical 
constitution of their minds? — in any thing whatever, except 
those extrinsic objects which were antecedently to their 
transgression a medium to them of enjoyment, and were 
thenceforth to become a source of suffering ? The sole 



75 



question then to be determined in regard to these external 
changes is, In what manner could they exert any influence 
over the voluntary conduct of mankind ? And this question 
was decided when it was shown, that no external cause in- 
fluences the voluntary actions of men, except through the 
medium of moral suasion ; — that nothing ever proves a cause 
of their sinning, but merely as a temptation. And to make 
the appeal again to experience : in what manner is it that 
those external circumstances actually do exert a pernicious 
influence on the actions of men ? Do want, labour, pain, 
sorrow, or the apprehension of death, ever prove the instru- 
ments of leading thern to sin through any other medium than 
that of temptation ? 

It will perhaps be said, " But it is probable that at least 
some of the evils here enumerated, arise from a change 
which the fall occasioned in the constitution of their bodies." 
Grant that it was so ; — and it goes entirely to confirm the 
position in question. For what are the relations of the bo- 
dy to the mind ? Are they not merely those of an external 
object V Is it not as truly extrinsic to it as any part of the 
material universe ? Is it any thing more than the mere in- 
strument of exciting the mind to action ? the medium of con* 
veying the means of moral suasion into the soul, as the cause 
directly of exciting in it all those affections which bear the 
name of appetite and sensation, and the organ through which 
all other external objects gain their access to it ? No change 
whatever therefore in the corporeal constitution could prove 
the instrument of involving mankind in sin through any 
other medium than that of temptation, let it be productive 
of want, pain, sorrow, or mortality, to any extent however 
great ; — any more than could any change in the surrounding 
world, subjectingthem to the same effects. And let the appeal 
be once more made to experience: Does not the moral in- 
fluence in question exerted by those evils on mankind, take 
effect through the same medium — that of temptation — in all 

10 



74 



casej whatsoever, whether they come into existence through 
changes occurring in their bodies, or arising in the external 
world ? 

Is it not manifestly the want, pain, and sorrow itself ex- 
clusively — and not at all any consideration whether it has 
its foundation in the corporeal constitution, or in the struct 
ture of the external world — that exerts that influence over 
men which leads them to sin ? 

But it will perhaps be said, " The penalty originally 
threatened to be inflicted on Adam, undoubtedly involved 
much more than a subjection to those external evils; and it 
being highly probable that his mental endowments were 
greatly superior to those of his posterity, [an opinion very 
often expressed,] it is to be believed that a more important 
and fatal change took place in his intellectual, than in his 
corporeal constitution." But where are the proofs that his 
mental powers were superior to those of his offspring ? Is 
it indicated by his knowledge of language so soon after his 
creation ? But is it ascertained that he invented the art of 
speech ? How does it appear but that he derived it entirely 
from revelation? Is it indicated by his having bestowed 
names on the creatures that were presented to him ? But 
would it at the present day be regarded as evincing any ex- 
traordinary energy of intellect, were one to give significant 
names to all the animals which happened to pass within the 
range of his notice? His being created by God surely 
cannot prove that he possessed any mental superiority over 
his posterity ; for they also are ail created by him. And 
haw can his yielding obedience at the commencement of his 
existence demonstrate it, any more than the obedience of 
Enoch, of Isaiah, and of Paul at a later period of their 
lives, can prove that they were gifted with a higher grade of 
intellect than others enjoy ? No evidence then whatever 
appears, that his mental energies were of a higher order 
than are those of his offspring. 



75 



But admitting that they were ; granting that he held a 
rank in energy and splendour of endowments far loftier 
than is occupied bj the most happily gifted of his children, 
and that he was shorn, and all his descendants, of that su- 
periority by his transgression — still it cannot affect our 
conclusions at all in regard to the manner in which his fall 
became the occasion of the disobedience of his posterity. 
For no retrenchment of his powers that left him still capa- 
ble of holiness, could by any necessity of its nature prove a 
cause of his sinning. How could any reduction of his un- 
derstanding subject him to such a necessity ? or how could 
a diminution of his capacity to exercise any of the species 
of affection for which his nature was adapted ? It has been 
shown that none of those kinds of affection are necessarily 
sinful ; that their moral nature depends on the manner in 
which they are exercised ; and that a being who has a capa- 
city to exert them in violation of his obligations, has of 
course the same capacity to exercise them in conformity to 
the divine will. 

No retrenchment therefore of those powers could consti- 
tute any unavoidable necessity of their being devoted to 
sin, or go at all to determine in what manner they would be 
exerted ; but it would be left to be decided entirely, as in all 
other cases, by the nature of the moral influence under 
which he was placed. 

Thus far then, the word of God goes entirely to verify 
the position under consideration. The statement made by 
the Most High of the influence of the fall, represents it as 
being expended wholly on the external condition of mankind, 
and as producing a set of effects therefore, whose agency 
on their voluntary conduct rnust necessarily take place 
through the medium of moral suasion. And the effects 
moreover represented to be produced by it,— want, toil, 
pain, sorrow, dependence, death,— are precisely those which 
manifestly from their nature are adapted, and which from 
all human experience are known to be the sources of the 



76 



most powerful temptations that ever assail the breast of man. 
But reader, this passage expresses all that the voice of re- 
velation utters on the subject, except the single fact that the 
disobedience of mankind is a consequence of Adam's trans- 
gression. The only other allusion made to it is in the fol- 
lowing passages. 

First. — " By one man sin entered into the world." " By 
the offence of one judgment came upon ail men to condem- 
nation." " By one man's disobedience many were made 
sinners." But these merely express the fact, that men be- 
come sinners, in consequence of the offence of Adam. They 
convey no intelligence respecting the manner in which it 
takes place, and decide nothing therefore in the present 
discussion. 

Secondly. — " In Adam all die." " By one man's offence 
death reigned by one." with several others of the same im- 
port. But these merely state the fact — expressed in the 
quotation from Genesis — that all mankind are subjected to 
death in consequence of the apostacy ; and it is moreover 
represented as exerting this influence over the posterity of 
Adam, simply by leading them to the commission of sin, 
which death of course follows as a penal consequence. 
" Death passed upon all for that all have sinned." 

It thus appears from all the light which the lamp of reve- 
lation throws on the subject, as well as from all the know- 
ledge respecting it we gain from other sources, that the only 
manner in which the fall of Adam became a cause of the 
disobedience of his offspring was, by occasioning their sub- 
jection to temptation. Its influence was expended entirely 
on objects external to their minds, and employed in produ- 
cing such changes in the material world, or in the course of 
divine providence toward them, and not improbably in their 
corporeal constitutions, that their lives are rendered of 
course a scene of unceasing and severe probation ; that as a 
consequence necessarily incident to their condition, the storms 
of trial and temptation beat on them incessantly through 



77 



the varied avenues of desire, of suffering, and of enjoyment, 
from the earliest dawn of their moral existence, up to that 
dread hour, when death seals up the sum of their sublunary 
agency, and bears them away to the retributive scenes of the 
invisible world. 

Can the reader need to be reminded how unlike these 
views are to the statements ordinarily made on the subject, 
which utter so much respecting a " want of original right- 
eousness, -the corruption of their whole nature," and even 
44 the guilt of Adam's first sin," devolved on all his posterity 
by the fall, and righteously subjecting them, antecedently 
to the exertion of any voluntary actions on their part, to the 
indignation and curse of God ? 

VII There is a moral influence which is adapted and 
adequate to lead mankind to holiness. 

This follows from the fact that — as has been shown — the 
influence of motives is the sole instrument of determining 
the manner in which men act in regard to their obligations ; 
and from the fact that they do in innumerable instances — 
that is all those who are renewed by the Spirit of God — act 
in conformity to the dvine will. Inasmuch as holiness 
thus actually results to such an extent from the influence of 
motives, it is clear that they have an influence which is 
adapted and competent to lead to holiness. 

Or to obtain the result in a different manner : All man- 
kind — as has been seen — are capable of acting in ac- 
cordance with their obligations : All then are capable of 
being excited to act in conformity to those obligations. 
There must then exist somewhere among the objects to 
which they sustain relations, a set of instruments competent 
to excite them to that course of action. But there are no 
objects except motives that have any capability of exciting 
them to any voluntary* action whatever. It follows, there- 
fore, that there is a species of motives which are adapted 
and adequate to lead them to holiness. 



78 



There is manifestly no intermediate ground between this 
conclusion and the doctrine that men have no capacity for 
obedience. To deny that there is any thing within the 
whole circle of objects to which they sustain relations, that 
can excite them to holiness, is plainly to deny that they 
have any capacity of being excited to that species of ac- 
tion ; and that is to deny that they have any capacity for 
that species of action itself. 

This view is confirmed moreover by every other consi- 
deration that has any reference to it. 

It is the only view that has any consistency with the na- 
ture of God's moral government. It has been seen that 
all the means which he employs as a legislator to lead men 
to holiness, exert their influence solely as motives ; and 
that a vast portion of those means are obviously selected, 
simply on account of their peculiar adaptation to reach the 
heart, and turn the current of its affections to the side of 
obligation. But what conclusions are to be formed if it is 
denied that those means have any competence or tendency 
whatever to attain the end for which they are professedly 
employed ? Has the Most High undertaken to gain an end 
by legislation, to which his means have no congruity what- 
ever? which lies in fact without the sphere of possibility ? 
Or has he instituted, and for near six thousand years em- 
ployed all the vast and complicated machinery of his 
moral administration, without any object ? Or again ; 
is the real object for which he employs it totally aside 
from that which its nature implies, and which all his 
language and demeanour unite in pronouncing it to be I 
Will any one venture to say that his commands, and expos- 
tulations, and calls, and entreaties, poured so incessantly on 
our ear, and in modes bespeaking such sincerity and earn- 
estness, are not at all intended to induce us to submit oursehes 
to his w ill. and embrace his favour? That after all the 
threatenings of his justice, no evidence whatever exists that 
he regards sin with any indignation, or has any purpose of 



79 



punishing its perpetrators ? For the denial of the position 
in question carries us inevitably to that result. For where 
can a particle of proof exist that he regards our sins with in- 
dignation, unless it at the same time constitutes equal evi- 
dence that he desired us to exercise holiness, in the place of 
those sins ? But where can any evidence exist that he desires 
us to exercise holiness, unless he expresses it by efforts to 
lead us to exercise it ? And where are any such efforts 
made, unless in his moral government 1 And how can his 
measures as a moral governour constitute such efforts, if — 
let their influence be carried to what extent it may — they 
have no adequacy nor adaptation whatever to attain that 
end ? If the means of his moral administration are not fitted 
and employed to excite us to obedience, he surely has taken 
no pains to lead us to that course of action ; and if he has 
taken no pains whatever to promote it, we are without a so- 
litary indication that he regards holiness with approbation, 
or has any desire for its existence. 

Thusapparentis it that the denial that there are any motives 
adapted and competent to lead men to holiness, is fraught 
with the most fatal inconsistency with the whole of God's 
moral administration, and the attributes of his character. 

Its denial is equally inconsistent with all human ex- 
perience. It will be admitted that there are innumerable 
individuals among mankind, who in many instances exercise 
obedience to the divine will ; and that they exert all their 
holy actions under the influence of motives. But that is to 
admit, that the motives under which they exert those actions, 
in all those instances, lead them to holiness. It follows 
then inevitably, that as far as we have any evidence of the 
existence of holiness in our world, we have the same evidence 
of the existence of motives adapted and adequate to lead 
men to holiness. And this conclusion is of course as just 
in regard to the first holy actions which men exert, as to 
those which they exercise at any other period of their lives, 



80 



But beyond this, it is indubitable that there is a certain set 
of moral objects — namely, the truths of God's word — which 
have a peculiar adaptation and competence to exert such an 
influence on the human mind. 

Such is the testimony of the apostle in regard to them. 
" All scripture is given by inspiration of God, and is profit- 
able for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction 
in righteousness, that the man of God may be perfect, tho- 
roughly furnished unto all good works.^ Can any one doubt 
that he spoke from an actual knowledge, that the truths of 
the divine word have an adaptation and adequacy — when 
properly brought to bear on the mind — to produce such ef- 
fects ? " The word of God is quick and powerful — [when 
the opposing influence of temptation being removed, it takes 
possession of the mind, and is allowed a full exertion on it 
of the energy with which it is fraught,] — and sharper than 
any two-edged sword, piercing even to the dividing asunder 
of soul and spirit and of the joints and marrow, and is a dis- 
cerner of the thoughts and intents of the heart." Can any 
one doubt that it is because such is their nature, that the 
scriptures every where inculcate an attention to their truths, 
as a mean of holiness ? 

Is it to be inferred from the fact, that wherever those 
truths are known, and in proportion as they are known, 
those individuals are seen who act in obedience to the di- 
vine will Wherever the scriptures are scattered, and their 
truths inculcated by a ministry, the children of God are 
found. 

And finally, it is demonstrated by the well known and ad- 
mitted fact, that during the period of inquiry and seriousness 
through which the Spirit of God leads men antecedently 
to their regeneration, the truths of the word are the great 
objects of their attention, and the instruments of producing 
their sense of guilt and danger*, that those truths are the 
motives under whose influence they exert their first holy 



81 



exercises, and to a great extent also all their subsequent 
obedience : and finally, that of the children of God, they 
who make the largest attainments in piety, are those who 
are most familiar with those truths : who have the justest 
views of their nature, and in whose minds their influence 
tneets with the least counteraction from other objects. 

If these facts do not demonstrate, that those truths are in 
their nature adapted and adequate to excite men to act in 
accordance with their obligations, what can ever show that 
any means have any competence or adaptation to the ends 
with which their agency is connected? Itthusappearsnoless at 
variance with all human experience on the subject, than 
with the^measures of the divine administration, to deny the 
existence of any motives fitted to lead men to holiness. 

But the great principles on which much of the foregoing 
reasoning proceeds, and many of the conclusions which have 
been adopted, carry us, as the reader must have foreseen, 
farther than the mere ascription to a portion of the motives 
under whose influence mankind act, of an adaptation and 
capacity to lead them to obedience. They require us to re- 
gard those motives to holiness under which they act when 
they yield obedience to the will of God, as being the cause 
exclusively of their yielding that obedience, in the same 
sense that those motives to sin, under whose influence they 
act when they disobey the divine law, are the cause of their 
exerting that disobedience. But the discussion of this topic 
belongs to the next article. 

VIII. The regenerating agency of the Divine Spirit is 
♦mployed solely in bringing that moral influence to bear on 
the mind, under which it exercises its obedience. 

This proposition is connected indissolubly with the pre- 
ceding positions. It is intuitively manifest, that the agency 
of the Holy Spirit must be employed either in accomplish- 
ing a change in the physical constitution of the mind, or else, 
leaving that as it was before, simply in exciting it to exert 

11 



82 



the attributes which form that constitution, in a new manner. 
But no change whatever, it has been seen, is wrought bj his 
agency in its physical constitution. And inasmuch as no 
depravity nor incapacity for holiness pertains to it, no such 
change is at all necessary : nor could, if accomplished, con- 
stitute regeneration in any sense ; nor be in any manner in- 
strumental to it. Such a change could be nothing else than 
a modification, of old. or a creation of new powers ; and 
what relation therefore could it have to regeneration more 
than is sustained by the original creation of the soul ? His 
agency then is employed solely in leading the mind to exert 
the physical nature which it before possessed, in a new man- 
ner. But it has also been shown, that there neither is nor 
can be any medium except that of a moral influence through 
which the mind can be excited to any species of voluntary 
action. It follows, therefore, that that agency of the Di- 
vine Spirit which leads the mind to holiness, is employed 
solely in bringing that moral influence to bear on it, under 
which its holy exercises are exerted. 

This view is moreover corroborated by all the light 
which the Scriptures throw on the subject, and by all the 
phenomena respecting it which take place within the sphere 
of our observation. 

1st. The word of God utters nothing inconsistent with 
it. It contains no intimation that the Divine Spirit in re- 
generating the mind, employs his agency in accomplishing 
any thing else than bringing a moral influence to bear on it. 
It utters nothing in regard to any alteration of the substance 
of the soul — an extinction of any old, or an addition of 
any new attributes. 

2d. On the contrary, it directly represents the Holy 
Spirit as accomplishing the renovation of the mind through 
the medium of a moral influence, namely, of the truths of 
the word of God. 

" Of his own will begat [regenerated] he us with the word 
of truth." " Being born again, [regenerated,] not of cor- 



83 



ruptible seed, but of incorruptible, by the word of GodS 1 
" The word of God is the sword of the Spirit." " Sanctify 
them through thy truth." " Christ loved the church, and 
gave himself for it, that he might sanctify and cleanse it with 
the washing of water by the word," " Ye received it not as 
the word of men, but as it is in truth the word of God, 
which effectually worketh also in you who believe." "Now 
are ye clean through the word which I have spoken unto 
you." " The law of the Lord is perfect, converting the 
soul." "As the rain cometh down and the snow from hea- 
ven, and returneth not thither, but watereth the earth and 
maketh it bring forth and bud, that it may give seed to the 
sower and bread to the eater, so shall my word be that 
goeth forth out of my mouth : it shall not return unto me 
void, but it shall accomplish that which I please, and it 
shall prosper in the thing whereto I sent it. For ye shall 
go out with joy, and be led forth with peace ; the moun- 
tains and the hills shall break forth before you into singing, 
and all the trees of the field shall clap their hands. In- 
stead of the thorn shall come up the fir tree, and instead of 
the brier shall come up the myrtle tree, and it shall be to 
the Lord for a name, for an everlasting sign that shall not 
be cut off." What is this but a prophecy, that it is by the 
instrumentality of divine truth that our world is to be re- 
novated, and become — instead of a scene of rebellion and 
misery — the abode of righteousness and peace ? 

With these declarations under his eye, can any one 
believe that the commonly inculcated doctrine, which re- 
presents "the truths of the word as in no sense instrumen- 
tal in changing" the mind, as having " no tendency" what- 
ever to change it, and as operating universally and necessa- 
rily " only to rouse its enmity to stronger action," ex- 
presses the fact in relation to the subject ? In what 
language can it be more explicitly expressed, that it is 
through the medium of the truths of the word that the 
Spirit of God renews the mind, than it is in these passages — 



84 



particularly the first two, whose terms u begat" and il born 
again^ every one must see have their whole reference to 
regeneration ? We had been authorized to infer that such 
is the mode in which renovation is accomplished, had the 
sacred volume gone no farther than not teaching any tiling 
inconsistent with such a belief; but having advanced be- 
yond, and presented to us this formal statement that regene- 
ration is effected through the medium of amoral influence, 
what alternative is left to us but to regard it as a fact, or re- 
ject the page of inspiration as the standard of our theologi- 
cal opinions ? 

But it will perhaps be asked, "Admitting that the Divine 
Spirit employs motives as an instrument in renovating the 
mind, still, after all, does he not do something more than 
merely bringing a moral influence to bear on it ?" What 
more 9 What more is necessary to be done ? What more 
can be done ? No physical change — as has been shown — 
is required; nothing needs to be accomplished, but simply 
to excite the mind to exert itself in a particular course of 
action. But it has been seen that there is no method of ex- 
citing it to any species whatever of voluntary action, but 
that of bringing motives to bear on it. Nothing beyond 
that, therefore, can the Spirit of God be imagined to em- 
ploy his agency in effecting. 

3d. This view is also verified by all the facts relating to 
the subject that fall under our observation. 

Those who are renovated, neither exhibit any indication 
to others, nor have any consciousness themselves of having 
experienced any change, except in their manner of acting 
in relation to their obligations. 

It is a well known fact that the minds of those who are 
renewed are, for a considerable period antecedently to their 
regeneration, as well as at that time, occupied in the consi- 
deration of the truths of God's word and their relations to 
themselves, to a far greater extent than they had been at 
former periods. 



85 



And finally, it is equally well known, that at the time of 
regeneration, a set of new and peculiar views respecting 
God, his government, and the work of redemption takes 
place in their minds, in relation to which their first obedient 
feelings are exercised ; a beam of light — as it is often ex- 
pressed — is poured over those objects, bringing them for- 
ward from their former remoteness and indistinctness, and 
giving them a presence and reality to the soul, and produ- 
cing a conviction of their excellence, and of its obligations, 
before unknown ; in connexion with which, there instant- 
ly takes place a feeling of disentanglement and extrication 
from the motives under which it had before acted, and 
emotions of surprise, and delight, and admiration, and joy, 
and ecstacy spring up, and thrill all its energies, and bear it 
away to lose itself amid the wonders and glories of the 
Deity. 

Now can any one fail to see that all this is perfectly na- 
tural, and in accordance with what might be anticipated, if 
regeneration be indeed accomplished through the medium of 
truth ; but not on any other view ? If truth has an instru- 
mentality in accomplishing that work, it must of course be 
thus present to the mind when the change is effected : but if 
it has not, no adequate reason for its being uniformly placed 
there, can be assigned. And if motives are the medium 
through which the change is wrought, the motives under 
whose influence it takes place must of necessity differ from 
all that had before been brought to bear on the mind ; 
otherwise no foundation could exist for their exerting a dif- 
ferent influence from any which had been before exerted. 
They must consist of different objects, or of objects presented 
in new attitudes, to exert a new influence ; and being made 
up of new objects, or objects seen through a new medium^ 
or in new attitudes, — as they would thereby become new 
motives, — their influence must of necessity differ from that 
which any other motives had exerted. But if motives are 
not the medium through which the change is wrought, no 



86 



reason can be seen for the fact that the change never takes 
place except in connexion with those new motives, and that 
it always takes place instantaneously on their being thrown 
. into the mind. No cause can be imagined why it should 
in any instance occur in connexion with them, any more 
than with many other motives that enter the mental eye. 

These several considerations then — that it is sustained by 
all the arguments which go to support the positions already 
established, that it is explicitly inculcated in the volume of 
revelation, and that it is corroborated by all the knowledge 
respecting it gained from observation, — make it clear, that 
the renovating agency of the Holy Spirit is employed solely 
in bringing a moral influence to bear on the mind. 

" But why" — it may perhaps be asked — " if motives are 
the means of regeneration, are men never regenerated with- 
out the agency of the Holy Spirit ?" Because without his 
agency the requisite motives never reach their minds. If 
they did, they would undoubtedly exert the same influence 
as when presented by his agency. But ask every child of 
God on earth, and they will answer that they never before 
had such views of the divine character and government, of 
the work of redemption, of their own character, and obliga- 
tions, and condition, as broke upon their minds at the time 
they exercised their first obedient feelings, and in relation to 
which those feelings were exerted. And they will testify 
moreover, that had they gained those views before, they 
should undoubtedly have cherished the same feelings under 
their influence. They are conscious therefore that such an 
array of motives never in any previous instance reached 
their minds. 

" But why do the requisite motives never gain access to 
their minds without the agency of the Holy. Spirit? The 
great truths of religion are in innumerable instances exten- 
sively known' to the unrenewed, are often made the objects 
of their attention, and are frequently presented to them in a 
manner apparently highly propitious to their exerting a sue- 



87 



cessful influence.'" The answer is given by the Son of God. 
" The cares of this world, and the deceitfulness of riches, and 
the lusts of other things entering in, choke the word, and it 
becometh unfruitful." Reader, such is the manner in which 
the Omniscient One explains it ! through the medium of 
temptation ! not by a " corruption of nature" derived from 
Adam ; or a physical incapacity to yield obedience to God. 
The truths of the word are met, and counteracted, and soon 
thrown aside, by a set of opposing objects which yield the 
mind higher gratification, and to which it therefore prefers 
to devote its regard ; in precisely the same manner as in- 
ducements to one course of conduct, are in any other in- 
stance, overcome by inducements to another. 

" But" — it will perhaps be asked — " if men are thus in- 
cessantly assailed by temptation, if such motives as will 
lead them to holiness never reach their minds, why are 
they to blame for not exercising holiness ?" 

Why was Pontius Pilate to blame for sentencing the Son 
of God to crucifixion, inasmuch as the requisite motives to 
lead him to a different course of conduct were not before 
his mind at the time ? Certainly not simply because he was 
excited to action by the motives which w r ere then before his 
eye : For that was a necessary consequence of their influ- 
ence ; and moreover, simply to act under the influence of 
motives — apart from the manner in which one acts — is not 
blameable. Certainly not simply because he exercised any 
of those species of affection to which those motives excited 
him ; as for example the desire to gratify the people ; for a 
ruler may desire to please his subjects without committing 
sin ; the moral nature of the affection depends on the man- 
ner in which it is exercised. Nor the desire which he show- 
ed to maintain his reputation and influence ; for that may 
also be exercised in a holy, as well as a sinful manner. Nor 
assuredly the regard to justice which he manifested in his 
reluctance to condemn Christ without any evidence of his 
being guilty. Nor as manifestly the religious fear or rexe- 



88 



fence which he exhibited, when informed that the Redeem- 
er claimed to be the Son of God. All these species of af- 
fection undoubtedly sprang up in his mind necessarily from 
tne agency of the motives under whose influence they 
came into existence 5 the indulgence of them therefore was 
not necessarily sinful ; they might have been voluntarily 
exercised in obedience to his obligations, as well as in viola- 
tion of them. He was to blame, therefore, solely because 
he voluntarily exercised some of the affections which those 
motives excited in him — namely, the desire to gratify 
the people and maintain his reputation and influence — 
to a degree which he was able, and was conscious of 
being able to avoid, and which he was also conscious 
was wrong ; and because he voluntarily did not exercise others 
of the affections which those motives excited in him — 
namely, the regard to justice and to God — to a degree to 
w T hich he was conscious of being able and under moral ob- 
ligation to exercise them. In other words, he was to blame, 
solely because he voluntarily exercised them in the manner 
in which he did. Who does not see that had he — instead 
of exercising them in that manner — yielded supremely to the 
emotions of justice and religious awe which were awakened 
in his mind, he would have emerged from that scene unpol- 
luted by crime, and transmitted his name to immortal reve- 
rence and admiration, in place of infamy ? 

And such is undoubtedly the manner in which all violations 
of the divine law take place, and such the reasons for which 
they are blameable. 

Two or three considerations resulting from these views, 
demand attention before this article is closed. 

1st. The distinction of the agency of God in the work of 
redemption, into that of a moral governour, and a sovereign 
efficient cause, is erroneous. It proceeds upon the ground 
that God does not employ the renovating agency of the Holy 
Spirit, as a moral governour, but simply as an efficient cause 
producing a physical change in the constitution of the soul. 



89 



But as that agency is occupied solely in bringing a moral in- 
fluence to bear on the mind, he employs it of course as a 
moral governour, as truly and exclusively as he employs 
any other agency whatever in that character ; in the reve- 
lation of his will for example, the appointment of a ministry, 
or the institution of any means to convey inducements to ho- 
liness to the minds of men. Of course, also, no more so- 
vereignty is exercised in employing the one method of 
bringing those motives to bear on mankind, than the other. 

2d. The distinction of the influences of the Divine Spirit 
into the classes of common and special ; restraining enlight- 
ening, regenerating, sanctifying, and comforting, is to be 
made solely on the ground that they occasion such diversi- 
fied effects ; not on the ground that they differ in their nature. 
For as his influences are all employed in presenting motives 
to the eye, they are of course always in kind the same. The 
difference in the effects of his agency, arises from the dif- 
ference in the motives through which he occasions those 
effects. 

3d. Restraint, conviction, sanctification, and comfort, 
when they result immediately from the influences of the Holy 
Spirit, are supernatural effects, in the same sense that rege- 
neration is. The term is to be employed simply to express 
the fact, that the effect to which it relates, is occasioned by 
the agency of the Spirit. It is peculiarly applicable to re- 
generation only on the ground that that never takes place 
except by the Spirit's influence. The other effects un- 
doubtedly often do. " Whosoever is born of God doth not 
commit sin, — [uniformly as before regeneration] — for his 
seed — [explained by another apostle to be the truths of 
God's word,]^remaineth in him, and he cannot sin, because 
he is born of God." Those views of the great truths of the 
word which were communicated at renovation, are retained, 
in the same manner as other views which make a strong im- 
pression on the mind, recur by the same laws of association 

n 



90 



when the objects which they respect, or with which they 
are connected, are presented to the eye ; and of course 
continue to exert essentially the same influence. Ask the 
christian, and he will answer that all this is verified by his 
daily consciousness ; that he now carries with him through 
every scene of his being, a set of views and associations 
respecting the great objects of religion, to which he was 
once a stranger ; and that they always operate to extricate 
him from temptation, or check him in the commission 7 of 
sin, by exciting the same species of feeling which arose in 
his heart when they first met his view, 

IX. Men are the efficient causes of their voluntary ac- 
tions. 

This must be sufficiently apparent to all who assent to 
the foregoing reasonings respecting the nature, obligations, 
and actions of men, or in fact — it would seem — seeing the 
results to which their principles carry them — to any rea- 
sonings whatever respecting their actions : as they are not 
only dependent on its truth for all their propriety, but aside 
from it, the very terms, capacity, obligation, and voluntary 
action, have no meaning whatever, or at best, none but the 
most loose and figurative. The proposition expresses a 
fact universally recognised by consciousness, and needs not, 
therefore, to be demonstrated, in order that men may, in 
their estimation of their own and each others obligations 
and actions, proceed on it as such. A consideration, how- 
ever, of the fact, that in all their judgments respecting their 
obligations and character, they do regard themselves as the 
efficient causes of their moral actions, and that the Most 
High also conducts toward them as such in all the measures 
of his moral administration, cannot be unimportant, and is 
peculiarly required on the present occasion, not only on 
account of its intimate connexion with the foregoing to- 
pics, and the advantageous illustration of it which they af- 
ford, but also by its relation to the subject which is next to 
be discussed. 



91 



When then is an act of a being the result of his own effi- 
ciency ? When it is purely his own voluntary exertion of 
his nature. The definition includes several considerations. 
1st. The being is the sole cause of the act: He originates 
it : It is wholly his own exertion of himself. 2d. It is ex- 
erted voluntarily — with design. And, therfore, Sd. It is 
exerted under the influence of motives ; which being 
united, makes it his own voluntary exertion of himself We 
have no higher conception than that of the efficiency of 
God. Let the reader elevate his eye to that infinite Being 
who is incessantly sending abroad through all his vast king- 
dom the most stupendous manifestations of his agency, and 
what other idea can he form of any one of his acts, than that 
it is his own voluntary exertion of his nature, constitution, 
essence, substance — or to drop these terms which are used 
simply to denote that which he is — his own voluntary ex- 
ertion of himself. And what does that idea, if analyzed, 
include, but that he is the sole cause of the act ; he origi- 
nates and effects it ; it is solely his own exertion of himself ; 
that it is exerted voluntarily ; and of course, therefore, 
that it is exerted under the influence of motives. 

And what now, on the other hand, must be separated 
from such an act in order to constitute an act or event, of 
which the being who is the subject of it, is not the efficient 
cause? Of course, 1st. His being the cause of it — his ori- 
ginating and effecting it. Instead of its being his own ex- 
ertion of himself, it must be a motion of himself by some 
other being. 2d. And inevitably, therefore, its being vo- 
luntary. He cannot be voluntary in an act which he has no 
agency in bringing into existence. A motion of his nature 
cannot take place by his volition, when it is caused wholly 
by some extrinsic being, and when of course, therefore, he 
is entirely passive in regard to its coming into existence, 
and has no knowledge nor expectation that it is to exist, 
till its existence has taken place. 3d. And consequently 
then, its being exerted under the influence of motives. Or 



92 



to express it in one proposition : it is not his own voluntary 
exertion of himself, but is caused entirely by the agency of 
some other being. 

The result then is, that to be the efficient cause of an act, 
is simply voluntarily to exert it. We have no higher, nor 
indeed any other conception of it. It is not more manifest, 
that by taking away from an act of a being, the idea of 
its being voluntary, we take away the idea of his being 
the efficient cause of it, than that by taking away the 
conception of his being its efficient cause, we entirely 
remove all conception of his exerting it voluntarily. 
The very definition of a being's acting involuntarily 
is, the world over, his being moved by some cause ex- 
trinsic to himself, and therefore his being passive in regard 
to the existence of the motion ; whilst on the other hand, 
a being's acting voluntarily, is to every one's conception his 
moving himself, in distinction from his being moved by an 
extrinsic cause ; his originating and effecting the act, in- 
stead of its being originated and effected by any thing exter- 
nal to himself. Our conception, therefore, of a being as 
voluntarily exerting an act, is identically our conception of 
him as the efficient cause of it. 

But it will perhaps be said, " To act voluntarily, is simply 
to act by choice. No consideration is necessary whether 
the act is exerted by the efficiency of the being in whom it 
takes place, or of some other being." 

But what is it to act by choice ? " To act by design," is 
it answered ? And what then is it to act by design ? To 
choose and refuse 1 to act under the influence of motives ? 
and to return to the point whence we started — to act vo- 
luntarily ? But what is to be gained by ringing in this man- 
ner — as some are accustomed — a perpetual change on a set 
of synonyms, without ever looking beyond mere terms? 
The inquiry is, not at all what is the name of the species of 
action in question, but what is the nature of that action it- 
self? What is the attitude or condition of the being who 
exerts it ? How does his relation to that kind of action 



93 



differ from his relation to those events of which he is the 
subject, in regard to which he is involuntary ? And the 
answer then is, to act by choice, is to act of one's self in- 
stead of being moved by some other being : and that is, 
to be the efficient cause of the act, instead of the mere 
subject in whom it is produced by some extrinsic cause. 
Otherwise, it follows inevitably — in contradiction to all 
our consciousness respecting our agency — that a being's re- 
lation to the existence of his voluntary actions, is precisely 
the same, as to those in regard to which he is involuntary ; 
the mere relation of an inert subject to effects produced in 
it by an external efficiency over which it has no control. 

What imaginable distinction can exist between voluntary 
and efficient agency ? Can the idea of a being as the effi- 
cient cause of an act involve any thing more than the idea 
of him as voluntarily exerting it ? Can we add any thing 
to our idea of the latter that at all heightens or helps out 
our conception of the former ? When we conceive of God 
as voluntarily exerting an act, does our idea fall at all be- 
low that which fills the mind, when we conceive of him as 
exerting an act by his own efficiency ? and are we obliged 
to superadd something to the first, in order that it may in- 
clude all that enters into the conception of the last ? What 
is more manifest than that it is impossible to conceive of any 
such addition ? And that arises necessarily from the nature. 
of voluntary action, which to all our conceptions, consists 
wholly in its being originated and exerted by the being in 
whom it takes place, in distinction from its being produced 
in him by any extrinsic cause ; whilst the production of an 
act in the latter manner is precisely what constitutes it an 
involuntary act. 

But it will perhaps be said— a position not unfrequently 
advanced — "it does not follow from the fact that we are con- 
scious Of acting of ourselves in our voluntary agency, that 
we are the efficient causes of our actions." But are those 
who hold this position aware of the conclusions to which it 



94 



carries us ? Our consciousness is our perception of the events 
which occur within us ; and it takes as complete cognizance 
of their nature as of their existence ; distinguishes their ori- 
gin as they are exerted by ourselves or produced by external 
causes as intelligently as any thing else pertaining to them ; 
and is of course our sole evidence of the existence of those 
events, and of all the external objects to which they relate. 
It is, moreover, in regard to our voluntary actions, indubi- 
tably, so far as we can conceive, precisely what it would 
be, were we their efficient causes. No one pretends to be 
conscious that his volitions are produced by an external effi- 
ciency. Every one feels that his voluntary actions differ 
as sensibly in their origin, as in any other respect, from those 
which are involuntary ; and that the difference lies in his 
exerting them himself, instead of their being produced by an 
external cause. 

What now is the bearing of the position in question, on 
these facts? It represents us as having no certainty that 
our consciousness in regard to our voluntary actions corres- 
ponds with fact ! But if such is the character of our con- 
sciousness, it manifestly results inevitably — since the certain- 
ty of all our knowledge depends on its testimony — that we 
have no medium of ascertaining what is fact in regard to any 
subject whatever. If it is so deceptive as to impress us 
with a conviction that we act of ourselves, when we 
are entirely passive, is it not apparent that we can place 
no reliance whatever on its testimony in any case ? What 
assurance, if it totally deceives us respecting the nature of 
our actions as it regards their origin, can we have that it 
does not in regard to their nature in every other respect ? 
What certainty have we, that we are in fact passive when 
we imagine ourselves to be? Our consciousness does not 
more decidedly represent us as acted upon by an external 
efficiency, when we view ourselves as passive, than it does 
as acting by our own efficiency when we exert volitions. 
Or what can ever prove to us. that what we regard as voli- 



95 



tions, original perceptions, or recollections, are truly such? 
or that our judgments have any such relations to the rea- 
sons for which we adopt them, as we suppose them to have ; 
or any relations to any reasons whatever ? and consequent- 
ly, that any of our conclusions in regard to the character 
and existence of the Deity, or of any external being, have 
any correspondence with fact ? 

Who does not see that we are hurled at once into the abyss 
of universal and remediless skepticism ? that we have in fact 
no certainty of our own existence? For if we do not exist 
in that state of acting of ourselves, which is the only state 
in which our consciousness represents us as existing when 
w r e act voluntarily — since our consciousness is the only evi- 
dence we have of our existence, — we plainly have no cer- 
tainty that we exist in any state whatever. We are thus 
compelled, — unless we would give up all our knowledge of 
God, of ourselves, and every other subject, and yield to uni- 
versal doubt,- — to regard our consciousness as according with 
fact in representing us as the efficient causes of our volun- 
tary actions. 

By the consideration then of the terms themselves, and of 
all our conceptions on the subject, we are carried to the con- 
clusion, that to exert an act voluntarily, is to be the efficient 
cause of it ; and that men are therefore the efficient causes 
of all their voluntary actions, as truly as God is the efficient 
cause of those which he exerts. 

What now are the relations which this position sustains to 
the topics that have passed under our discussion ? 

1st. It is confirmed by all our reasonings on the subject of 
obligation. It has been shown, that our feeling of obliga- 
tion to exercise any given course of action, is wholly founded 
— so far as our discussion goes — on our consciousness that it 
depends entirely on ourselves, whetherwe pursue that course 
of action or not — or in other words, that it is possible to us, 
and in such a manner, that nothing but ourselves can prevent 
our exerting it, without annihilating our obligations to exert 



96 

it. That such is our consciousness, none, it is believed, will 
deny ; but its accordance with fact plainly depends entire- 
ly on our being the efficient causes of our voluntary actions. 
If we are not, they are of course the effect of God's efficien- 
cy ; and if he creates them, their existence manifestly does 
not depend in any sense upon us, any more than the exist- 
ence of any other effects which he creates. Depend on us 
for their existence ! How ? Not by our causing them ; for 
by the supposition he is their sole cause. By our occasion- 
ing them ? But the question relates solely to their efficient, 
not to their occasional cause. Depend on ws for their ex- 
istence ! Then of course, God is dependent on us for the 
exertion of the efficient acts by which he gives them exist- 
ence ! Will any one embrace that absurdity ? and for the 
sake of making out that roe are dependent on God for the 
existence of our actions ? Besides, is that the way in which 
we are conscious it depends on ourselves whether we exert 
our voluntary actions or not ? But the proposition is self- 
evident. Nothing can be more intuitively certain, than that 
if no act can take place in us but by his creating it, it is not 
in any sense possible for us to exert any acts but those which 
he creates, nor to avoid the exertion of any winch are pro- 
duced in us by Ins efficiency. What then is the conclusion 
to which the argument carries us ? We cannot avoid be- 
lieving, what by our consciousness we know to be a fact, that 
our exerting our voluntary actions — so far as this discussion 
goes — depends solely on ourselves : and as it is intuitively 
certain that that cannot be a fact, unless we are the efficient 
causes of those actions — we are of course bound by all the 
rules of philosophising to believe that we are. 

2d. It is demonstrated by the manner in which the Most 
High treats mankind in his moral government. If they 
are not efficient causes — cauable of originating and ex- 
erting those actions which his law requires, there can be 
no more propriety in instituting a moral administration over 
them, than over brutes and inanimate objects. Either they 



97 



exert their voluntary actions by their own efficiency, or God 
creates them. But if no acts can take place in them but by 
his creating them, what can at once be more absurd and 
more unrighteous, than to require them to give existence to 
such acts ? Above all, what can be more unrighteous and ab- 
surd, than to require them to exert a course of acts 
which he has no design of ever creating in them ? Let the 
appeal be made to common sense. Reader, were the Most 
High to command you henceforth to traverse the villages 
and cities of this land, and daily to perform such miracles as 
were wrought by the Apostles — without imparting to you 
the requisite power, or performing the miracles himself in 
connexionwith your agency — or at all altering his providence 
toward you, so as to make your obedience practicable ; — 
nay, were he — to make the case parallel — in place of that, 
to chain you at home, or to bear you away by a miracle be- 
yond the scene of the prescribed agency, — could you feel 
to blame for not complying with the command ? Could you 
regard the requirement as just ? Could a surrounding world ? 
and witness with approbation your punishment for not com- 
plying with it ! Could the saint on earth or in heaven most 
anxious to vindicate the ways of God to man, ever satisfy 
himself that such an act was compatible with rectitude ? But 
why any more unjust or absurd to require you to exert such 
a course of acts, than — if no acts can ever take place in 
mankind but by his creating them — to require them to exert 
a course of actions which he has no design of ever creating 
in them ? What adaptation can such requirements have to 
them, more than to brutes or the dead ? Prescribe authori- 
tatively to a species of beings in whom no event can take 
place but by his creating it,— -the exertion of a series of acts, 
which he has no intention of ever- creating in them, — and 
prohibit the existence in them of other events which he de- 
signs to create in them, — and then express indignation to- 
ward them, and inflict on them interminable punishment, 

13 



98 



because those acts which he created took place in them ; and 
because other acts which he did not create, did not take 
place in them ; and finally, add to all this the mockery of 
calling it wisdom and righteousness ! What among all the 
excesses of human folly and crime ever made any approxi- 
mation to such absurdity and injustice ? But is not this what 
God^s moral government would be, if men were not the ef- 
ficient causes of their actions ? There surely was never a 
plainer case. If men are not the efficient causes of their 
actions, the Most High creates in them innumerable acts 
which his law prohibits, and then condemns and punishes 
them because he created those actions in them ; and on the 
other hand, commands them to exert innumerable actions 
which he never creates in them, and then consigns them to 
everlasting misery because he did not create in them those 
actions. 

But no one assuredly can ever adopt a doctrine bearing on 
its very face such tremendous imputations against God, Avho 
sees any thing of its relations to his own consciousness and 
obligations or to the divine character and administration. 

The result then is, that as surely as there is any holiness or 
guilt in our world ; as surely as goodness wisdom and justice 
are attributes of the great Being whom we adore and trust, 
mankind are the efficient causes of their voluntary actions, 
as truly as God is the efficient cause of those which he 
exerts. 

3d. It will only be added in farther vindication of this 
position, that it is sustained by the views which have been 
presented respecting the influence of motives. The proprie- 
ty of those views plainly stands or falls with the truth of this 
position. If God creates the actions of men, nothing can 
be more manifest than that motives can have no influence 
whatever in determining the manner in which they act, nor 
in exciting them to action. How can a motive produce an 
effect in the human mind, if no effect whatever can take 
place there but by Godh creating it . ? The supposition is 
self-contradictory. But does this tally with human expe- 



99 



rience ? Is it the part of common sense to adopt it for the 
sake of its consistency ? 

The rejection of the position that men are the efficient 
causes of their actions, is, of course, also at equal variance 
with the views which have been presented respecting the 
capacity of mankind, — the influence of the fall on their con- 
dition, — and the nature of the Spirit's agency in the work of 
renovation. Its relations to those topics are too obvious to 
leave any discussion in regard to them necessary. 

The amount of the whole then is, that we must either 
regard men as the efficient causes of their actions, or adopt 
the position that God creates them : that in regard to the 
first, it is sustained by all the testimony of consciousness, by 
all our knowledge of the distinction between right and wrong, 
by all our conceptions of the nature of efficient and volun- 
tary agency, by all the measures of God's moral administra- 
tion and the attributes of his character : and that in respect 
to the last, it is opposed alike to all our knowledge on the 
subject, our obligations and the morality of our actions, and 
to the benevolence, knowledge, and justice of the Deity. 
Can any one then hesitate which view is most worthy to be 
adopted ? 

The relation of this great truth to two or three topics, 
demands attention before this article is closed. 

1st. The fact that men are the efficient causes of their 
actions, is the reason that God places them on probation ; or 
puts it wholly to them to decide what their character and 
destiny shall be : that he places " life and death" before 
ihem — delineates their obligations, and reveals the conse- 
quences which are to attend the course they pursue — and 
tjien requires them to " choose life." They being the ef- 
ficient causes of (heir actions, such a species of administra- 
tion .toward them is adapted to their nature, is proper and 
necessary. 

2d. Their efficiency is the foundation of their responsibi- 
lity for the manner in which they act. As their being 
the efficient causes of their actions, is the reason of their 



100 



being placed under law, and of its being put to tbem to se- 
lect what course they will pursue ; so it is the ground of their 
desert of praise or blame for their actions. And it is ob- 
viously a just and perfect foundation of responsibility, and 
the only one that can exist. 

3d. It shows the consistency of God's desiring mankind 
to yield perfect obedience to his law, and of his not going 
at the same time any farther than the employment of his 
present system of means to lead them to it. That he pre- 
fers they should yield that obedience, is of course a fact, 
being declared by all his language, demeanour, and attri- 
butes. What were his whole government but a system of 
accomplished mockery, if that were not a fact ? if he ac- 
tually preferred that men should commit sin, instead of 
yielding obedience ? As surely, therefore, as there is truth 
in his declarations, and an accordance of his feelings with 
his actions, it is indubitably certain that he entirely prefers 
that mankind should at all times act in accordance with his 
law. And that preference — and all his expressions of it 
— are of course — if men are the efficient causes of their 
actions — natural, proper, and necessary. For inasmuch as 
his law delineates to them the wisest course of action, and 
they are completely able, and thence under obligation to 
pursue it, his infinite wisdom must of necessity prefer that 
they should pursue that course. But were not they, the 
efficient causes of their actions, could nothing take place in 
them but by his creating it, there could be no consistency in 
his cherishing such a preference, while he neglected to 
create in them such a course of action ; nor indeed could 
the existence of such a preference in his mind ever be de- 
monstrated or believed. And — men being the efficient 
causes of their actions — it is also equally consistent for him 
— while thus supremely desiring them always to act in ac- 
cordance with his law — not to go any farther than the use of 
his present system of means to lead them to it. He may 
have the best reasons for it. It plainly does not follow, that 
because he desires them in their present condition to yield 



101 



him obedience, he must, to be consistent, lead them at all 
events to obey him, let it involve the introduction of what 
alterations it may in their circumstances — in the structure 
of their bodies for example — and of the material world, 
and in the measures of his providence and moral govern- 
ment. Who knows but what the attainment of that end 
would require the entire exclusion of temptation from them, 
and consequently their total exemption from every thing 
like a probation, and of course, therefore, their being 
treated in a manner wholly unsuited to them as efficient 
causes, to whom it belongs from their nature to decide 
their destiny by a choice between good and evil ? Who 
does not see — notwithstanding it is supremely desirable 
that men should in their present condition always act in 
obedience to his will — that still the most imperative rea- 
sons may exist for his not introducing any alterations ia 
their condition in order to lead them to that obedience ? 
May not earthly rulers desire their subjects to obey their 
laws, without being obliged — in order to be consistent — to 
employ such a system of means as shall infallibly persuade 
them to it invariably ? May not their knowledge and 
goodness unite in leading them to prefer to leave them in 
many instances to transgress, rather than to resort to such 
a system of measures ? And may it not be equally the 
part of the knowledge and goodness of the infinite Being 
to pursue such a course in regard to his subjects ? 

Such is undoubtedly the reason of his conduct toward- 
mankind. Were there any other course fraught with high- 
er advantages, he would pursue it in place of this. It 
is because he sees it to be better to leave them to transgress 
as they do, than to introduce any alterations in their condi- 
tion to prevent it, that without employing any more pre- 
ventive means, he leaves them to transgress in that man- 
ner ; because he sees he can pursue a course of agency to- 
ward them — transgressing in their present circumstances — 
involving a higher degree of knowledge and goodness, and 
fraught therefore with a happier influence on his kingdom 



102 



at large, than he could were he to adopt any other system of 
procedure toward them. And all this is plainly perfectly 
consistent with its heing better, were mankind always to 
act in conformity to his will, instead of transgressing as 
they do ; and therefore entirely consistent with his desiring 
that they should always obey instead of violating his law, 
while at the same time he employs no farther means to 
lead them to it. 

X. The purpose of God has a different reference to his 
own agency, from what it has to the voluntary agency of 
mankind. His purpose respecting them, includes all the 
events ever to transpire having any relation to them ; and 
as some of those events are the product of his efficiency, 
and some of theirs. Ins purpose of course contemplates them 
according to their different relations to himself as the effects 
of his own, or of the efficiency of men, and only indirectly 
the consequence of his. His agency sustains to theirs, the 
relation of an antecedent to a certain consequent. In de- 
termining what should be all the events of his own agency, 
he made it certain also what should be all the events of 
theirs ; and undoubtedly resolved on his own on account of 
its influence on theirs. 

Such being the fact, his purpose then in regard to man- 
kind is to be viewed as having the relation of a decree, only 
to his own agency respecting them, and as contemplating the 
events of their agency simply as consequences of his own, 
whose existence being made certain by his agency, it was 
unnecessary to decree. 

This will be rendered more apparent by a reference t6 
what has been advanced respecting the efficiency of mem 
and the influence of motives in determining the manner in 
which they exert that efficiency. If those views are correct, it 
is not to be supposed that he makes the actions of men the 
subject of any thing more than his purpose. Why should he 
directly decree the existence of what is not to result direct- 
ly from his decree nor efficiency, but is to come into exist- 
ence by the efficiency of men ? What influence could such 



103 



a decree have ? It could not efficaciously give existence to 
any of those actions ; for they are all to be exerted by the ef- 
ficiency of the beings in whom they take place. It could 
not be instrumental — as an occasional cause — to their be- 
ing exerted ; for nothing but a moral influence is instrumen- 
tal in leading men to the exertion of their efficiency, and in de- 
termining the manner in which they exert it. Of consequence, 
it could have no influence in making the existence of their ac- 
tions certain ; for as their existence is determined by the moral 
influence under which men are placed, it is made certain by 
his decree to place them under that moral influence. Such 
a decree must then be totally inefficacious, and of course is 
not to be ascribed to God ; but as his agency respecting their 
actions extends no farther than simply bringing the motives 
to bear on them under which they exert their actions, and 
as by placing them under the influence of those motives, he 
renders it certain in what manner they will act, his decree 
respecting them is to be regarded as relating solely to his 
placing them under that influence ; and as having its whole 
reference therefore to his own agency. 

Or in other words : His purpose was to give existence to 
a series of events — including all having any relation to man- 
kind — that should constitute the highest practicable sum of 
good. His decree was that determination, which rendered 
the existence of all those events certain ; and as his deter- 
mination in regard to his own agency rendered their exist- 
ence certain, his decree of course had its whole reference 
to that agency. 

XI. The certainty that mankind will hereafter act in 
the manner in which they will, is constituted by the nature 
of the moral influence under which they are to act. Those 
who sin, will pursue that course, in consequence of the temp- 
tations which will assail them ; and those who yield obedi- 
ence, in consequence of the inducements to holiness which 
will be brought to bear on them. Those who are renewed, 
will persevere unto salvation, in consequence of God's not 



104 



suffering them to be tempted above what they are able, but 
with their temptation providing a way for their escape. 

XII. The complete sanctification of believers will take 
place at their death, as a natural consequence, by their re- 
moval to a scene which will present to them the highest in- 
ducements to holiness, without — perhaps — any temptations 
to sin. 

CONCLUSION. 

These views are offered to the public, with the conviction, 
that they accord with the doctrines of revelation, and disen- 
tangle theology from many distressing embarrassments with 
which the prevalent system respecting it is fraught. It were 
easy to sustain them by a much more copious reference to 
the sacred volume, and many more arguments from other 
sources : but it is believed their propriety is too obvious to 
leave it necessary. The great principles on which they rest 
are plain and open to every one's knowledge, and are ad- 
mitted to be incontrovertible, even by those, — as it were 
easy to show — whose system stands opposed to them. It is 
not imagined to be necessary in order to the adoption of 
them, that any new fundamental principles should be em- 
braced : but simply that those which have always been held 
and regarded as of primary importance should be pursued 
to their legitimate results, and such opinions rejected as are 
inconsistent with them. The work is therefore commended 
to the friends of religion with the hope that it may enjoy 
their candid examination, and prove auxiliary to the cause 
of truth and righteousness. 



THAT THE COMMON 

THEORIES AND MODES OF REASONING 

RESPECTING 
EXHIBIT IT AS 

A PHYSICAL ATTRIBUTE, 



WITH 



A VIEW OF THE SCRIPTURAL DOCTRINE 



RELATIVE TO 



THE NATURE AND CHARACTER OF MAN 



A MORAL AGENT, 



NEW-YORK. 



PUBLISHED BY F. & R. LOCKWOOD, NO. 154 BROADWAY. 

C. S. Van Winkle, Printer, 2 Thames-street. 
S 1824. 



No. 154 BROADWAY. 

We are continually enriching this establishment with works of 
interest and value, and no pains nor reasonable expense is spared to 
make it deserving of the patronage which has been bestowed upon it, 
and which we are proud to say, is constantly increasing. We expect 
in a short time to receive an addition to our former list of foreign 
periodicals, that will not, we think, be unappreciated by our sub- 
scribers. 



BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY. 

We have been engaged for a year past in preparing for publica- 
tion a work of General Biography, to comprise the whole of Lem- 
priere, with selections from Watkins, brought down to the year 1821, 
together with a complete account of distinguished American charac- 
ters, to be written on the plan of Lempriere. 

The whole will be comprised in two large octavo volumes, to be 
printed on fine paper, and is offered to subscribers at eight dollars, 
the price at which Lempriere alone was formerly published. In 
consequence of our having been obliged to send to all parts of our 
extended country for materials, the American part has progressed 
but slowly, but now, it is nearly completed and the whole will in a 
short time be put to press, * ^ 

F. & R. LOCKWOOD 
WStlApril, 1824 *> 



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